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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thomasjefferson andjames Madison, it is safe to assume, never envi-
sioned multi-channel fiber optic digital networks carrying voice, video and 
data at the speed of light. Nonetheless, the eighteenth century promise of 
freedom of expression will still need to be fulfilled in the ever-changing 
Information Age. 
While the principles of the First Amendment are timeless, their appli-
cation has always varied with the introduction of new technology. As has 
ofttimes been stated, "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto 
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itself' and that law must reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses and 
dangers' of each method."l 
The essential nature of the new media technologies will be the ability 
of many speakers to reach many listeners quickly and at relatively low cost. 
For First Amendment analysis, the primary complicating factor is that this 
multitude of speakers will have to utilize distribution networks which may 
be limited in number and operated by either private or governmental enti-
ties. If these entities seek to control either the identity of speakers or the 
content of the speech, the hope for truly diverse communications may be 
thwarted. If a local telephone company bars access to an information ser-
vice, the lack of reasonable alternative means of reaching the desired audi-
ence may mean financial ruin for that service.2 
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to assume that everyone 
must have the automatic right to "speak" over the new technologies wher-
ever and whenever they choose.3 If one group wants to establish a com-
puter forum for their particular religion, for example, atheists should have 
no right to demand access to that particular forum to attack the ongoing 
services.4 
It will become necessary, therefore, to sort out the competing claims 
of those involved in the electronic chain of communication. Cable televi-
sion operators, telephone companies and computer networks have all at-
tempted to lay claim to the electronic speech which is traveling through 
"their" wires into the home. But the owner of the wire does not always have 
the right to control the information it carries. While it seems increasingly 
true that "the medium is the message,"5 as far as the First Amendment is 
concerned, sometimes the medium is merely the messenger. 
The first part of this Article will explore how the distinction between 
speakers and distributors has affected rights and liabilities within tradi-
tional media. This distinction is necessary for understanding the differing 
protection the First Amendment provides for liberty of circulation as op-
posed to editorial discretion. A newspaper's editorial choice has always 
been viewed as fundamentally different from the selection process utilized 
by a distributor. Protection for the latter's "liberty of circulation" is fo-
cused primarily on safeguarding the ability of speakers to reach their audi-
ence, not for the ultimate benefit of a carrier. 
The next section examines the lessons from Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCG.6 In this case, the Supreme Court rejected calls to analogize 
cable television to either print or broadcast, and instead established an in-
1 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981). 
2 See, e.g., Westpac Audiotext, Inc. v. Wilks, 756 F. Supp. 1267, 1273 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating 
that phone company's objective in cutting off billing and collection services to information ser-
vice was to put it "out of business"), vacated, 804 F. Supp. 1225 (1992). 
3 The First Amendment does not require "that people who want to propagandize protests or 
views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please." Ad-
derly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966); accord United States Postal Servo v. Council of Green-
burgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 917 (1981). 
4 See, e.g., David Gonzalez, The Computer Age Bids Religious World to Enter, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
1994, § 1, at 1; Patricia King, The Search for God goes Digital, NEWSWEEK, May 10, 1993, at 68. 
5 See MARsHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 7 (1964). 
6 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). 
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termediate standard, reflecting the dichotomous role of cable television as 
both speaker and conduit. 
The last section creates a framework for analyzing First Amendment 
issues and the new media technologies. Carriers which have the ability to 
control access to essential pathways of communications can be subject to 
content-neutral regulation designed to encourage carriage of a diversity of 
information sources. Governments, however, are not permitted to turn pri-
vate carriers into authorized censors of the speakers they carry. Finally, 
liability rules for distributors must be sensitive to the ease with which dis-
tributors can be deterred from carrying the controversial speech of others. 
Carriers should only be liable if they are active participants in illegal speech 
or if they have been informed that an independent tribunal has deter-
mined the speech to be unprotected. 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUE IN DISTRIBUTING IDEAS 
A. Distinguishing SPeakers and Distributors 
First Amendment coverage extends to "the communication, to its 
source and to its recipients both."7 The issue gets trickier when analyzing 
the transit of the communication from "source" to "recipient." For the 
goals of the First Amendment to be realized, the distribution of ideas must 
be protected. Many distributors, such as cable operators and telephone 
companies, have attempted to parlay this protection into a right to domi-
nate a medium. Though it is sometimes lost in analysis, the "protection" 
afforded by the First Amendment for distributors is not identical to that for 
speakers. The difference is based on the simple truth that protection for 
distributors is derived from the value the Constitution has placed on the 
cargo being hauled, not the inherent value of hauling. 
Freedom of expression is valued as both an integral aspect of personal 
freedom and as a means to greater social good.8 In realizing these goals, 
distributors of communication play a role that is fundamentally different 
from the role played by the sources of the communication. Distributors 
are primarily important only insofar as they assist the source in reaching its 
audience. 
The difference between the roles of speakers as opposed to distribu-
tors is most apparent when viewing the relationship between free speech 
and "human dignity and selffulfillment."9 As the Supreme Court has 
noted: "The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one's 
mind is . . . an aspect of individual liberty-and thus a good unto it-
7 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
756 (1976). 
8 See, e.g., Whimey v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that free expression is valued "both as an end and as a means"), ooerruled by Brandenberg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
9 RODNEY A SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT § 2.03(1), p. 2-24 (1994). Smolla and Nimmer include a section entided "Human 
Dignity and Self-Fulfillment" in their overview of Free Speech Theory. 
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self .... "10 The interest obviously relates only to the source of the informa-
tion and not to an independent distributor. While arguably all human 
activity, including package delivery, contributes to a generalized notion of 
self fulfillment, 11 the creation of speech is unique: "The individual self-
fulfillment that comes from speech is bonded to the human capacity to 
think, imagine, and create."12 The relationship between freedom of 
speech and individual autonomy is similarly evident in many of the "com-
pelled speech" cases which barred the government from requiring that par-
ticular statements be uttered: "The right to speak and the right to refrain 
from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 
'individual freedom of mind."'13 
Beyond the benefits for the individual speaker, freedom of expression 
serves society as a whole. This freedom is necessary for democratic self-
government,14 and is essential for the pursuit of truth in "political, eco-
nomic, religious or cultural matters."15 Again, these benefits flow from the 
source of the information.16 
One of the fundamental themes of the First Amendment is that the 
more of these sources there are, the better it is for a free society. The First 
Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the 
welfare of the public."17 Accordingly, there is a substantial "public interest 
in diversified mass communications."18 
10 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503 (1984); acrord 
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) (stating that "[t]he individ-
ual's interest in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the concern 
for open and informed discussion. H). As Professor Smolla explained: "Freedom of speech thus 
embraces a right defiantly, robustly, and irreverently to speak one's mind just because it is one's 
mind." SMOLLA, supra note 9, at §2.03(1), p. 2-24. 
11 See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 25 
(1971). 
12 SMOLLA, supra note 9, at § 2.03(2) (c), p. 2-27. 
13 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943». 
14 See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1901 SUP. Cr. REv. 245, 263. 
15 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 
(1967) ("The guarantees for free speech and press are not the preserve ofpolitica1 expression or 
comment on public affairs ... . n); Abrams v. United. States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., 
dissenting) ("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by the free trade in ideas-that the 
best test of truth is ... to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... "). 
16 The First Amendment also serves as an instrument of social control by permitting govern-
ment opponents to protest peacefully and to try to effect change without violence. See Stromberg 
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (stating that maintaining free public discussion "to the 
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be ob-
tained by lawful means, an opponunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundanlental 
principle of our constitutional system"); see also THOMAS 1. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY 
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12-13 (1966): 
They will feel that they have done all within their power, and will understand that the 
only remaining alternative is to abandon the ground rules altogether through resort to 
force, a course of action upon which most individuals in a healthy society are unwilling 
to embark. In many circumstances they will retain the opportunity to try again and will 
hope in the end to persuade a majority to their position. 
The interest is obviously served by ensuring a multitude of sources. 
17 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also New York Times, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (referring to "a profound national commitment ... that de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"). 
18 FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 802 (1978). 
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A corollary to these principles is that society is best served if the choice 
of which diverse opinions are to be expressed and considered is made by 
each individual citizen. The First Amendment was designed to place "the 
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us 
... in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of 
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests."19 
To fulfill the promise of the First Amendment, the number of ideas 
offered should be maximized and, accordingly, there should be as many 
speakers as possible. To accomplish this, the relationship between speak-
ers, distributors and the government needs to be carefully calibrated. Sev-
eral principles must be pursued simultaneously: 
(1) Speakers must have maximum autonomy to control the content of 
their speech and bear legal responsibility for its consequences. Speakers 
also must have effective ways for getting their messages to willing listeners. 
(2) Distributors must not be prevented or discouraged from carrying a 
multitude of voices, either by direct governmental censorship or indirect 
inducements to engage in private censorship. 
(3) The government rn,ust remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas, but 
may regulate in a reasonable, content-neutral manner to increase the diver-
sity of information sources. 
Based on these principles, the constitutionality of regulation of com-
munications sometimes differs depending on whether it affects speakers or 
distributors. Without question, in neither instance can the government act 
to aid favored points of view or inhibit unpopular opinions.20 However, 
distributors, unlike speakers, can be forced to carry the expression of 
others.21 By contrast, speakers, unlike distributors, can be held responsible 
for repeating the speech of others, even without knowledge that the speech 
is unprotected.22 
In the case of the emerging media technologies, it is essential, if not 
always easy, to tell the difference between "speakers" and "distributors." 
The constitutionality of governmental regulation may well depend, for ex-
ample, on a determination of which party is "speaking" when a broadcast 
station is carried on a cable television system or a "dial it" service is pro-
vided by a local telephone company. 
19 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); see also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 
114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458 (1994) ("At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each 
person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, considera-
tion and adherence."). 
20 See, e.g., Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable."); West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in pOlitics, national-
ism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... "). 
21 Compare Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) (stating that 
freedom of speech includes "the decision of both what to say and what not to say") with National 
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that, for 
common carriers, "customers 'transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing'") (quoting 
Industrial Radiolocation Serv., 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (1966». 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 43-46. 
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Initially, it is essential to bear in mind that not all participants in the 
communications process are "speakers." If a store sells a typewriter, it is 
not responsible for the messages produced by the purchaser.23 When San 
Diego passed an ordinance sharply limiting the permissible content on bill-
boards, the Supreme Court permitted billboard owners to challenge the 
constitutionality of the ordinance-not because the owners were "si-
lenced," but on behalf of others who pay for the right to post their 
messages: "One with a 'commercial interest' ... [can] challenge the facial 
validity of a statute on the grounds of its substantial infringement of the 
First Amendment interests of otherS."24 
With each new form of communication, courts must distinguish be-
tween speakers with First Amendment rights and those carriers of informa-
tion with just a "commercial interest" in those speakers' rights. The fact 
that a distributor of information may select some of what is carried does 
not transform that distributor into an "editor" for all of the information 
carried. As far as the First Amendment is concerned, while all editing re-
quires selection, not all selection constitutes "editing." A brief review of 
the ways courts have applied the concepts of both "liberty of circulation" 
and "editorial discretion" to earlier forms of communication will aid in 
constructing a model for the emerging media technologies. 
B. Liberty of Circulation 
The first case that described the constitutional protection for the dis-
tribution of ideas was Ex parte Jackson.25 While permitting a ban on mailing 
lottery information, the Court declared that censorship by the post office 
would violate the First Amendment: "Liberty of circulating is as essential to 
... [freedom of the press] as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the 
circulation, the publication would be of little value. "26 The "liberty of circu-
lating" that was being protected was not, of course, that of the courier, the 
U.S. Postal System. Rather, the liberty protected by the First Amendment 
was that of a publisher using the post office as a distribution system.27 As 
Justice Holmes later remarked: "The United States may give up the Post 
23 See, e.g., Anderson v. New York Tel., 320 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1974) (holding that a telephone 
company leasing equipment used to replay taped messages is not responsible for defamatory 
transmissions) . 
24 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505 (1981) (emphasis added). As 
Justice Stevens noted, the billboard owners: 
have standing to challenge the ordinance because of its impact on their own commer-
cial operations. Because this challenge is predicated in part on the First Amendment ... 
they also have standing to argue that the ordinance is invalid because of its impact on 
their customers-the persons who use their billboards to communicate with the public. 
Id. at 544 (Stevens,]., dissenting in part). 
25 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
26 Id. at 733; accord Lovell v. City of Griggin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938); see also Bantam Books, 
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 n.6 (1963) ("The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press 
embraces the circulation of books as well as their publication .... H). 
27 See also United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 
U.S. 407, 430 (1921) (Brandeis,]., dissenting) ("But to carry newspapers generally at a sixth of 
the cost of the service, and to deny that service to one paper of the same general character, 
because to the Postmaster General views therein expressed in the past seem illegal, would prove 
an effective censorship and abridge seriously freedom of expression.H ) (footnote omitted). 
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Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost 
as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues .... "28 
The Court has also recognized that sources of information often dis-
tribute their own messages, and that their self-distribution is covered by the 
same "liberty of circulation."29 If a note is written, it must be passed from 
writer to reader for communication to occur. To stop this passage would 
be functionally indistinguishable from silencing the speaker. 
In Martin '!. City of Struthers,so the Supreme Court ruled that the door 
to door distribution of noncommercial handbills was protected by the First 
Amendment. The Court's description of the facts of the case makes clear 
that the "speaker" and the "distributor" were one and the same: "The ap-
pellant, espousing a religious cause in which she was interested-that of 
the Jehovah's Witnesses-went to the homes of strangers ... in order to 
distribute to the inmates of the homes leaflets advertising a religious meet-
ing."31 In striking down her conviction, the Court recognized the link be-
tween the thoughts she wished to communicate and the means of 
communication she had chosen to utilize: "[D] oor to door distributors 
[are] ... engaged in the dissemination of ideas in accordance with the best 
tradition of free discussion .... Door to door distribution of circulars is 
essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."32 The Court con-
tinued: "Freedom to distribute information to every citizen whenever he 
desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society 
that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and 
manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved." 33 
Ms. Martin's freedom to distribute information to willing recipients, 
thus, was inextricably linked with her efforts to engage in free discussion.34 
If a business which carried packages was to carry packages containing her 
flier, however, the analysis of the courier's constitutional interest would be 
different. 
In 1949, the Supreme Court upheld a law which banned the display of 
advertising on the sides of all trucks except for products sold by the owner 
of the truck.35 Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, explained the logic 
behind the distinction: 
[T]he hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt with 
differently than those who act on their own .... [TJhere is a real difference 
between doing in self-interest and doingjor hire, so that it is one thing to toler-
28 [d. at 437 (Holmes,]., dissenting). The Supreme Court has frequently quoted this state-
ment approvingly; see, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983); Blount v. 
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971). 
29 See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759-62 (1988). 
30 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
31 [d. at 142. 
32 [d. at 145. 
33 [d. at 146-47. 
34 See also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Alma Lovell ha4 been distributing 
religious pamphlets on city streets, and in doing so, "she regarded herself as sent 'by Jehovah to 
do His work. '"[d. at 448. The Court ruled that her "liberty of circulating" had been violated by an 
ordinance giving unlimited licensing discretion to the city manager. [d. at 451-52. 
35 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). The truck owned by Rail-
way Express Agency, a package carrier, was carrying advertisements for Camel Cigarettes, 
Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus, and a local radio station. [d. at 108 n.2. 
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ate action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to 
permit the same action to be promoted for a price.36 
The "real difference" between speaking for oneself and carrying the 
message of another impacts on the relationship each activity has to the 
interests and purposes of the First Amendment. It is not that the hireling is 
outside the scope of the First Amendment; it is just that the different na-
ture of protection afforded reflects the different speech interests 
implicated. 
This distinction is even apparent in the Supreme Court's analysis of 
the print media. Bookstores, periodical stands and wholesale distributors 
sell the work of many different authors and publishers and are covered by 
the First Amendment.37 Content-based regulation of these distributors is as 
suspect as content-based regulation would be of the information sources.38 
This protection, however, does not necessarily mean that the owner of a 
newsstand or bookstore is "speaking"; rather, it is a tribute to the essential 
role such distributors play in conveying the speech of others. 
It is certainly possible for booksellers to "adopt" the ideals and opin-
ions expressed in the books they sell. Religious and political bookstores 
abound, and the owners of those stores are obviously "expressing" them-
selves by their choice of books.39 Even general interest bookstores and 
newsstands rightfully may claim that their selection process embodies their 
desire to communicate specific thoughts.40 
Mass vendors often are not "expressing themselves" by their choice of 
what to sell, and such vendors still serve a vitally important communica-
tions function protected by the First Amendment. For example, in Smith v. 
California,41 the Supreme Court struck down a law which criminalized the 
possession of obscene materials by bookstore owners even if they had no 
knowledge of the books' contents. Finding that the effect of such "strict 
liability" would be that booksellers would only be willing to sell books hav-
36 Id. at 115-16 (Jackson,]., concurring) (emphasis added). This case preceded the advent of 
constitutional protection for commercial speech (see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976», and was based on an equal protection chal-
lenge. Nonetheless, the distinction between the interest of those speaking on their own behalf 
and those speaking for hire was reaffirmed by the Supreme Coun when it determined that ban-
ning offsite, while permitting onsite, commercial billboards did not violate the First Amendment. 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511 (1981) (citing Railway Express Agency, 336 
U.S. at 115 (Jackson,]., concurring». 
37 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) ("Certainly a retail bookseller plays a most 
significant role in the process of the distribution of books."); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 
U.s. 58, 61-64 (1963) (finding a violation of freedom of the press even though "[t]he Commis-
sion's notices [to book distributors listing books and magazines it had deemed to be obscene and 
thus objectionable for sale] were circulated only to distributors and not ... to publishers."). 
38 In Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 58, the Supreme Coun struck down a practice by the "Rhode 
Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth" ofissuing informal threats to bring obscenity 
prosecution. The Coun found the government to have violated the First Amendment in attempt-
ing "to intimidate the various book and magazine distributors and retailers and to cause [the] ... 
suppression of the sale and circulation of [the publications]." Id. at 64. 
39 See generally Martin Pedersen, To Tie In or Not to Tie In; Booksellers Dispute the Effect of Movie 
Edition Cover Art, PUBUSHERS WEEKLY, July 26, 1993, at 24. 
40 See generally Afro-American Publishing Co. v.Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649,652 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en 
banc) (describing owner of pharmacy which sold various publications but who refused to sell 
local newspaper because of disagreement over paper's position on civil rights). 
41 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
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ing contents which they had inspected, the Court held that the law imper-
missibly"tend[edJ to impose a severe limitation on the public's access to 
constitutionally protected matter."42 
It was certainly not the booksellers' interest in communicating their 
own beliefs and ideas that was being protected in Smith. The Court granted 
them immunity from prosecution precisely because of their total ignorance 
of, and unconcern with, the beliefs and ideas expressed in the books.43 
The First Amendment was protecting the booksellers, instead, only because 
of the critical role they played in getting constitutionally protected material 
from source to recipient.44 ' 
This distinction between "speaker" and "distributor" has also pro-
tected the owners of bookstores and newsstands from countless defamation 
lawsuits. The common law generally imposes liability on those who repeat 
the defamatory charges made by others,45 but provides special protection 
for booksellers and news vendors.46 A newspaper which copies a defama-
tory article from another publication, even with full attribution, is as re-
sponsible as if it had been the original publisher.47 A newsstand operator 
who sells the same paper, however, is not treated as a "repeater" unless he 
or she knows of the defamatory content.48 
For the electronic media, the contrast between source and distributor 
is most clearly evident in the law of telegraph and telephone companies. 
From the inception of these technologies, the owners of the wire were not 
viewed to be "speaking" themselves when they transmitted others' 
messages, and they had no "editorial discretion" to select among proffered 
messages. 
In 1837, when Samuel Morse was seeking governmental support for 
his system of electro-magnetic telegraphy, he compared the telegraph to 
the postal service: "[AJlthough it does not carry ... mail, yet it is another 
mode of accomplishing the principal object for which the mail is estab-
lished, to wit: the rapid and regular transmission of intelligence."49 
42 Id. at 153. 
43 See also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 464, 467-68 {1994} {stating that it 
would be "positively absurd" to hold that a Federal Express courier who is told only that a pack-
age contains "film," is knowingly transporting obscenity if the film is later adjudged to be 
obscene}. 
44 Similarly, book publishers were permitted to bring an action to stop a Rhode Island Com-
mission from threatening to bring obscenity proceedings against a wholesale distributor. Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 n.6 {1963}. 
45 As early as 1610, English judges had ruled that if a person knew a statement was libelous 
and "repeats it, or any part of it in the hearing of others, or ... he reads it to others, that is an 
unlawful publication of it." John Lamb's Case, 9 Co.Rep.*59b, 77 Eng. Rep. 822 {161O}. 
46 Compare REsrATEMENT {SECOND} OF TORTS § 578 {1977} {"Except as to those who only 
deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise repub-
lishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it."} with REsrATE-
MENT {SECOND} OF TORTS § 581 {1977} {"[O]ne who ... delivers or transmits defamatory matter 
published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of 
its defamatory character."}. 
47 SeeREsrATEMENT {SECOND} OF TORTS § 578 cmt. b {1977}; see also Martin v. Wilson Publish-
ing Co., 497 A2d 322,327 {R.I. 1985}. 
48 E.g., Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228 {S.D.N.Y. 1981}. 
49 Letter from Samuel Morse to Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury, September 27, 
1837, reprinted in JOHN BITNER, LAw AND REGUlATION OF ELEGrRONIC MEDIA 3-4 (2d ed. 1994). 
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This conception of the telegraph led to an obligation for non--discrimi-
natory carriage of the messages of others: 
[A]n owner or manager of [a telegraph] line becomes to a certain extent 
a public seIVant or agent. . . . He cannot refuse to receive and fozward 
despatches; nor can he select the persons for whom he will act .... He is 
required to send [messages] for every person who may apply, at a usual or 
uniform tariff or rate, without any undue preference, and according to 
established regulations applicable to all alike.5o 
It was widely accepted that these requirements "tend to prevent mo-
nopoly and exclusive privileges, and to secure to the public an equal enjoy-
ment of the benefits arising from this new method of intercommunication 
between distant points."51 
An additional rationale for common carriage obligations was that 
many of the telegraph companies received governmental assistance. The 
1888 Telegraph Lines Act required every telegraph company which had 
received a federal "subsidy"-either land, rights-of-way, bonds or loans of 
credit-to provide service "without discrimination in favor of or against any 
person, company, or corporation whatever, and shall receive, deliver, and 
exchange business with connecting telegraph lines on equal terms."52 
The duties imposed on telegraph companies have given them even 
greater protection against suits for defamation than other distributors like 
bookstores and newsstands. In addition to being protected if they do not 
know or have reason to know of the defamatory character of a libel,53 tele-
graph companies are given a second layer of defense. Even if a telegraph 
company is aware that a message is false and defamatory, the company will 
not be held responsible unless it "knows or has reason to know that the 
sender is not privileged to publish it."54 The rationale for this rule rests on 
both the statutory duties imposed on the telegraph companies and on the 
special benefits made possible by telegraph over earlier forms of 
communication: 
The duty imposed upon a telegraph company by ... statutes, as well as by 
common law, requires it to fozward messages for any who request[ ] the 
service; ... the large number of messages which a telegraph company is 
required to transmit, the speed expected in the transmission of the 
messages, the number and character of the minor employees needed in 
the business, and the difficulty of the legal questions involved, make it 
impracticable for the company to withhold or deliver messages until it 
can make an investigation as to their truth or privileged character.55 
The invention of the telephone followed that of the telegraph by a half 
century. Somewhat bizarrely, when telephone service began it was viewed as 
a medium distinct from the telegraph, because it featured oral as opposed 
50 Ellis v. American Telegraph Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 226, 232 (1866). 
51 Id. 
52 Act of Aug. 7, 1888, ch. 772, § 2, 25 Stat. 382, 383 (1889) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 10 
(1988) ). 
53 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 581(1) (1977). 
54 Id. § 612(2). 
55 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lesesne, 182 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1950). 
1995] UNCOMMON CARRIERS 89 
to written communications.56 The similarities between the two forms of 
electronic communications rapidly dwarled the differences, and in 1910, 
Congress declared them both to be "common carriers."57 Under Sub-
chapter II of the Communications Act, neither telephone nor telegraph 
companies are permitted to "make any unjust or unreasonable discrimina-
tion in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or 
services. "58 
The traditional limitation on carriers to pick and choose whose speech 
to carry and whose to block is not only constitutionally permissible, it em-
bodies the very principles of the First Amendment. As the late Ithiel de 
Sola Pool noted: 
[While] common carrier doctrine often lacks explicit reference to civil 
liberties, many of the same concerns are dealt with in different words. In 
its own way the law of common carriage protects ordinary citizens in their 
right to communicate. . .. The rules against discrimination are designed 
to ensure access to the means of communication in situations where the 
means, unlike the printing press, consist of a single monopolistic net-
work. Though First Amendment precedents are largely disregarded in 
common carrier law, still this one element of civil liberty is central to that 
law.59 
Civil liberty is not threatened by the imposition of common carriage 
obligations per se. It is only when such obligations interfere with true edito-
rial discretion that the First Amendment is endangered. 
C. Editorial Discretion 
As seen in the discussion of libel,60 courts have long treated the selec-
tion decisions inherent in creating a newspaper as different from those 
made in stocking a newsstand. The communications service provided by a 
newspaper is inextricably connected to what the Supreme Court has 
termed, "the function of editors. "61 The Court noted, "The choice of mate-
rial to go into a newspaper and the decisions made as to limitations on the 
size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public 
56 In holding that the new telephone companies did not have the same right to use post 
roads for their wires as did telegraph companies, the Supreme Court explained the differences 
between the two media: 
[Telephone companies utilized a] device by which articulate speech could be electri-
cally transmitted or received between different points, more or less distant from each 
other .••. [while telegraph companies] employed the means then used ... for the 
purpose of transmitting messages merely by sounds of instruments and by signs or writ-
ing ..•. Governmental communications to all distant points are almost all, if not all, in 
writing. The useful Government privileges which formed an important element in the legis-
lation would be entirely inapplicable to telephone lines, by which oral communications only 
are transmitted. 
Richmond v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1899) (emphasis added). 
57 Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, § 7,36 Stat. 539, 544-45 (1910). For a superb history 
of the regulation of telephone companies, see Angela]. Campbell, Publish or Carriage: Approaches 
to Analyzing the First Amendment Rights of Telephone Companies, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1071 (1992). 
58 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988). 
59 ITHIEL DE SOIA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 106 (1983). 
60 See supra text accompanying notes 45-48. 
61 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
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officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial con-
trol andjudgment."62 . 
A statute requiring a newspaper to give a "right of reply" to a political 
candidate whose personal character it opposed was declared unconstitu-
tional in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.63 In Tornillo, the Court de-
clared that" [a] newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for 
news, comment, and advertising."64 As the Court later remarked, "Tornillo 
affirmed an essential proposition: The First Amendment protects the edito-
rial independence of the press."65 
The First Amendment also protects the "independence" of a news-
stand operator, but in a somewhat different manner. The Constitution 
equally prohibits governmental attempts to limit the publications they of-
fer. 66 Unlike an access requirement for newspapers, though, governmental 
attempts to maximize the number of periodicals sold at a stand do not put 
freedom of the press at peril.67 One court has upheld a city ordinance 
governing the granting of permits for operating a newsstand on city streets, 
which gave a preference to "an applicant who has the higher, not the 
lower, proposed number of publications to be sold from the newsstand."68 
The court stated that this preference "does not infringe, but rather pro-
motes First Amendment interests. [The ordinance] conceivably 'censors' 
only the newsstand operator who himself might eliminate certain publica-
tions from distribution. "69 
For the print media, therefore, protection for the "source" of the in-
formation includes the writing, editing and distribution of one's own 
words. The independent distributor of books and periodicals, while play-
ing a critical role protected by the First Amendment, is protected primarily 
against content-based governmental actions, particularly those which re-
strict the diversity of the publications offered. 
Broadcasting has created a host of problems for First Amendment ju-
risprudence, in large measure because of the combination of speech and 
distribution functions inherent in the medium itself. A broadcaster pro-
vides programming analogously to any other source of information. The 
programming is "distributed" however, over the airwaves, a means of distri-
bution not available to all. While the speech function of broadcasting has 
earned it some measure of "editorial discretion," the meaning and scope of 
that discretion is quite different than that of the print medium. 
62 Id. 
63 418 u.s. 241. 258 (1974). 
64 Id. 
65 Turner Broadcasting System. Inc. v. FCC. 114 S. Ct. 2445. 2464 (1994). 
66 See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan. 372 U.S. 58, 64 n.6 (1963). 
67 Cf. Tornillo. 418 U.S. at 261 (White.].. concurring) (stating that. "Woven into the fabric of 
the First Amendment is the unexceptional. but nonetheless timeless, sentiment that 'liberty of 
the press is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is to go into a newspaper.'" 
(citing 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MAss COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1947»). 
68 Grafh. City of Chicago. 9 F.3d 1309, 1321 (7th. Cir. 1993). cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1837 
(1994). 
69 Id. The court concluded that there was no danger of censorial motive in this requirement, 
describing it as "an obvious attempt at variety, not indoctrination." Id. 
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In CBS v. Democratic National Committee,70 the Court upheld the FCC's 
refusal to require broadcasters to accept paid "editorial advertisements." 
The Court described the role of broadcasters deciding whether to broad-
cast certain advertisements as similar to that of newspaper editors: "For bet-
ter or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is the selection and 
choice of material. That editors~newspaper or broadcast-can and do 
abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the discre-
tion Congress provided. "7~ . 
Despite the apparent linkage of broadcast and newspapers in this case, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment's protection 
of "editorial discretion" for broadcasters differs significantly from that for 
newspapers. Both before and after CBS v. Democratic National Committee, the 
Court has upheld the constitutionality of a right of access to broadcasting 
as consistent with the broadcasters' editorial discretion. 
Four years earlier, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,72 the Court up-
held the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine, which required broad-
casters to cover controversial issues by accurately reflecting opposing views 
and provide time for those who had been personally attacked.73 Based on 
the scarcity of the airwaves, the Court distinguished broadcast from print 
"Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast 
than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable 
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every indi-
vidual to speak, write or publish. "74 The Court belittled the attempt of 
broadcasters to claim the same total dominion over the airwaves that a 
newspaper publisher exercises over his or her printing press: "[T]he First 
Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others from broad-
casting on 'their' frequencies. "75 
Eight years after describing broadcasters' "editorial discretion" in CBS 
v. Democratic National Committee, the Court found no constitutional flaw in 
another broadcast access requirement. In CBS v. FCC,76 the Court upheld a 
statute requiring broadcasters to sell advertising time to legally qualified 
candidates for federal office.77 The law had been challenged as violating 
"the First Amendment rights of broadcasters by unduly circumscribing 
their editorial discretion."78 The Court rejected this argument by stressing 
the additional First Amendment rights of both "candidates to present, and 
the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of 
70 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
71 Id. at 124-25. 
72 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
73 These rules were repealed by the FCC in Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R 5043 (1987), 
afFd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). 
74 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 388. 
75 Id. at 391. The Court also remarked, this time without the derisive quotation marks: 
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requir-
ing a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or 
fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of 
his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. 
Id. at 389. 
76 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
77 Id. at 397 (upholding 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1952». 
78 Id. at 394. 
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the democratic process."79 Recognizing the validity of the competing free 
speech claims, the Court concluded that "the statutory right of access " .. 
properly balances the First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the 
public and broadcasters. "80 
One lesson from this triad of cases is that broadcasters do enjoy "edito-
rial discretion," but the meaning of that phrase is different than when used 
in the print medium. Broadcasters have failed to convince the Supreme 
Court that their "discretion" must be as absolute as newspaper publishers 
in order to be meaningful. For example, in striking down a law which pre-
vented noncommercial broadcasters from editorializing, the Court noted 
that a total ban on broadcaster speech was in "sharp contrast to the restric-
tions upheld in Red Lion or in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, which left room for editorial 
discretion and simply required broadcast editors to grant others access to 
the microphone. "81 
Because of the different ways access might be gained to that 
microphone, broadcasters' liability for defamation varies, depending on 
whether they are viewed as speaker or distributor. A broadcast station can 
be held liable even for programming independently produced by the net-
work with which it is affiliated.82 By contrast, the Supreme Court has held 
that a broadcaster must be immune from any liability for any libelous mate-
rial broadcasting over "its" frequency by a speaker who has gained access 
pursuant to statutory mandate.83 
Radio call-in shows present a special case. The broadcaster voluntarily 
chooses to utilize such a format, but much of the speech is provided by 
callers who are otherwise unrelated to the station. Call-in programming 
has been characterized as "the modern version of the town meeting . . . 
[which] afford[s] every citizen an opportunity to speak his mind on any 
given issue."84 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that a 
radio station did not have to use a tape-delay to screen out defamatory 
calls, citing the First Amendment value in avoiding rules "requiring private 
censorship."85 The court warned that: 
The impact of censorship would not fall upon the broadcaster's words 
and ideas; instead, it would be applied to the opinions and ideas of those 
members of the public who elected to participate in this kind of public 
forum. The application of any technique of censorship to such a public 
forum can only result in the ultimate extinction of that forum.86 
Rules regarding both access and tort liability have varied depending 
on the forms of communication to further the twin goals of preserving 
79 Id. at 396. See also id. at 396 ("The First Amendment interests of candidates and voters, as 
well as broadcasters, are implicated .... "). 
80 Id. at 397. 
81 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 385 (1984). 
82 See, e.g., Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 890 (W.D. Mo. 1934). 
83 Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959). This 
immunity was necessary for avoiding "the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps 
criminal liability to be imposed for the very conduct the statute demands of the licensee." Id. at 
53l. 
84 Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 566 (Wyo. 1976). 
85 Id. at 557. 
86 Id. at 567. 
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speaker autonomy and maximizing the number and variety of speakers car-
ried by distributors. Where speech and distribution functions are com-
bined, these goals need to be balanced. 
For the emerging technologies, a similar calculus will need to be ob-
tained. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,87 the Supreme Court be-
gan this difficult process. 
ill. A PAGE TuRNER: THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH FOR 
NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES 
From its humble origins as Community Antenna Television (CA1V), 
whose sole purpose was to improve the reception of a few local broadcast 
signals in hilly terrain, cable television has evolved into a distribution sys-
tem capable of delivering more than one hundred channels of program-
ming from satellite, microwave, broadcast and other sources.88 As cable 
television technology grew more sophisticated and cable television regula-
tion more complicated, the battle over the constitutionality of cable televi-
sion regulation began in earnest.89 
The primary difficulty in deciding the constitutionality of cable televi-
sion regulation arises from the governmental decision to combine the dis-
tribution function with the speech function. As one court noted: 
[T]he city has painted itself into this corner by conflating the program-
ming and utility functions of cable. For First Amendment purposes, we 
are concerned primarily about restrictions on programming, not on 
stringing wires or digging trenches; without the signals transmitted along 
the wires, cable is basically like any other utility, which may be regulated 
without implicating the First Amendment. 90 
The first step in analyzing the con~ptutionality of cable regulation is 
determining the appropriate First Amendment standard to apply.91 The 
resolution of this question requires a disentangling of the dual functions-
distributor and speaker-performed by a cable operator. With no clear 
guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts s1rJ.1ggled mightily to con-
front this problem.92 
87 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). 
88 See generally DANIEL BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO 
§ 1.02[1] (1993). 
89 A sampling of the range of issues can be seen in the listing of more than 20 separate 
franchise provisions that were challenged in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 13 
F.3d 1327, 1329 nn.2 & 3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2738 (1994). The Supreme Court 
opinion at 476 U.S. 488 (1986) is generally referred to as Preferred 1, while the 1994 Ninth Circuit 
opinion is referred to as Preferred II. 
90 Preferred II, 13 F.3d at 1331. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between First 
Amendment principles and cable television, see Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of 
Expression, 1988 DUKE LJ. 329. 
91 See, e.g., Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(stating that "[a] threshold question for our first amendment analysis is what standard of review 
to apply"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988). 
92 The difficulty befalling these courts can be seen in the note which the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit appended to a cable case to explain the more than one year time lag 
between oral argument (June 8, 1988) and its decision (July 19, 1989). The court noted that 
"[t]he delay in issuing this opinion was caused by lengthy panel deliberations about the out-
come." Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1540 (7th Cir. 
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After almost three decades of deciding cable television cases without 
resolving this threshold issue,93 the Supreme Court finally announced the 
First Amendment standard for evaluating the constitutionality of cable reg-
ulation.94 What is especially significant about this case was that the Court 
rejected appeals to resolve the issue by simplistic analogizing to earlier 
forms of communication, and instead focused on the realities of contempo-
rary electronic mass communications. 
A. The Limits of Analogy: Creation of an Intermediate Standard 
Much of the early legal skirmishing on the appropriate First Amend-
ment standard for cable television focused on whether to use the "print" 
model or the "broadcast" mode1.95 Opponents of cable television regula-
tion had long tried to argue that cable television was an "electronic newspa-
per," and that the selection of cable programming by a cable operator was 
"indistinguishable" from the editorial discretion exercised by a newspaper 
owner.96 Several lower courts agreed that there was no "constitutional dis-
tinction between cable television and newspapers."97 
Some who supported cable regulation urged that cable television sys-
tems be treated analogously to broadcast television stations, in that both 
communicated electronically over public byways (streets or airwaves) and 
there were a limited number of each kind of speaker.98 One court, in up-
holding cable television public access requirements, declared, "Red Lion, 
1989) (upholding the constitutionality of a city requirement that cable operators present local 
programming), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). 
93 See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Com-
munications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); 
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); United States v. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. 649 
(1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). 
94 See infra text accompanying notes 136-40. 
95 Some creative commentators proposed the telephone model, based on the shared monop-
oly characteristics. See, e.g., Mark Nadel, COMCAR: A Marketplace Cable Television Franchise Structure, 
20 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 541, 552 (1983); see also POOL, supra note 59, at 168 ("[T]he natural legal 
analogy for the physical element of a cable system is neither the printing press nor the broadcast-
ing station, both of which are competitive, but the telephone common carrier system, which is 
obligated to carry whatever anyone wants to put on it at nondiscriminatory rates."). But see Fron-
tier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958) (stating that cable television was not a common car-
rier because cable operators selected which broadcasters to carry). 
96 See, e.g., Henry Goldberg, Cable Television, Government Regulation, and the First Amendment, 3 
COMM.jENT. LJ. 577 (1981); Note, The F.C.C., the First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 133, 146-47 (1976). See generally GEORGE H. SHAPIRO ETAL., 'CABLESPEECH' 3 (1983) 
("The cable industry in recent years has frequently been analogized to newspapers for First 
Amendment purposes."). 
97 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 
(1977); see also Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1056 (8th Cir. 1978), afJ'd on other 
grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The 1978 and 1979 decisions are commonly referred to as Midwest 
Vuleo II, to distinguish them from an earlier decision upholding an FCC requirement that cable 
operators originate local programming. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 
(1972) (Midwest Vuleo 1). 
98 See, e.g., Roscoe L. Barrow, Program Regulation in Cable TV: Fostering Debate in a Cohesive 
Audience, 61 VA. L. REv. 515, 530 (1975); see also Petition for Rulemaking to Establish Local Origination 
Requirements for Cable Tv, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1299 (1971). 
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the seminal case of contemporary communications law, retains its vitality in 
the high-tech world of cable television. "99 
The first Supreme Court discussions of this issue did little to clarify the 
matter. In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,lOO the Court struck down an FCC 
attempt to impose public access requirements on cable operators.101 The 
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit had ruled that Congress never au-
thorized the FCC to issue such requirements,102 and that, moreover, the 
similarity between cable operators and newspaper owners made the access 
requirements constitutionally suspect. lOS In keeping with the principle 
that courts should try to resolve cases on non-constitutional grounds rather 
than deciding a constitutional question unnecessarily,104 the Supreme 
Court struck down the rules as contrary to the FCC's statutory mandate. 
The Court, however, could not resist entirely acknowledging the constitu-
tional issue, and dropped this tantalizing point into a footnote at the end 
of its decision: 
The Court below suggested that the Commission's rules might violate the 
First Amendment rights of cable operators. Because our decision rests on 
statutory grounds, we express no view on the question, save to acknowledge 
that it is not frivolous and to make clear that the asserted constitutional 
issue did not determine or sharply influence our construction of the 
statute.105 
The declaration that the print model analogy was "not frivolous" was 
not necessary and not helpful. It was unnecessary to include because the 
Court simply could have stated what it says so often: "Because we find the 
[non-constitutional issue] to be dispositive of this question, we need not 
consider petitioner's constitutional argument .... "106 Instead, the Court's 
vague pronouncement invited more in the nature of reading tea leaves 
than constitutional adjudication. l07 
99 Berkshire Cablevision of RI., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 986 (D.RI. 1983), vacated as 
moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 
660 F.2d 1370, 1378 (10th Cir. 1981) (upholding cable franchising regulation, in part, because 
"[i]nherent limitations on the number of speakers who can use a medium to communicate has 
been given as a primary reason why extensive regulation of wireless broadcasting is constitution-
ally permissible"), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982). 
100 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
101 See Report and Order, Docket 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976). 
102 Midwest Vuieo II, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), affd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
103 Midwest Vuieo II, 571 F.2d at 1054-56. 
104 See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) . 
105 FCC v.Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979) (emphasis added). 
106 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) ("Because we find the 
forum-selection clause to be dispositive of this question, we need not consider petitioner's consti-
tutional argument as to personal jurisdiction."); see also United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 
U.S. 351, 359 (1988) (stating that because the Court found that a 1937 statute never exempted 
certain local obligations from federal estate taxes, "[it] therefore need not consider the constitu-
tionality of [a 1984 law purporting to eliminate such exemption]"). 
107 See, e.g., In re Quincy Cable 1V Inc., 93 F.C.C.2d 412, 422 (1983) Uones, Comm'r, dissent-
ing) ("If we are to infer law from foornotes .... Foornote 19 seems a virtual invitation by the 
court for a proper case in which to consider the constitutional arguments pressed so insistently by 
Quincy Cable."); see also Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322, 1388 
(E.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that "public access requirements may have their own constitutional infir-
mities. The Supreme Court has explicitly refused to rule on the first amendment permissibility of 
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The Court's next venture into the debate over the use of analogy for 
deciding the constitutionality of cable television regulation was not much 
more successful. In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 108 
the Court dealt with a constitutional challenge to a city's exclusive franchis-
ing system.109 Mter noting that cable television operations "plainly impli-
cate First Amendment interests,"110 the Court issued this paradoxical 
statement concerning the scope of cable operators' First Amendment inter-
ests: "Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of speech and the 
communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of newspaper and 
book publishers, public speakers and pamphleteers. [The cable operator's] 
proposed activities would seem to implicate First Amendment interests as 
do the activities of wireless broadcasters . ... "111 
This discussion did nothing to resolve the question of which model 
was to be utilized. By comparing cable operators simultaneously to both 
newspaper publishers and wireless broadcasters, the Court confounded 
rather than clarified the issue.I 12 A concurrence by Justices Blackmun, 
Marshall and O'Connor recognized this difficulty and indicated that a new 
way of approaching this question was percolating at the Court: "In assessing 
First Amendment claims concerning cable access, the court must deter-
mine whether the characteristics of cable television make it sufficiently 
analogous to another medium to warrant an already existing standard or 
whether those characteristics require a new analysis."113 
In 1994, the Supreme Court finally issued its new analysis. In Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v FCC,114 the Court was faced with deciding 
whether Congress could require cable systems to set aside channels for the 
carriage of the signal of local over-the-air broadcasters [the "must carry 
rules"] .115 The Court did not actually resolve the immediate legal contro-
versy,116 but did establish a framework that will be utilized not only for 
analyzing regulation of cable television, but of future communication tech-
nologies as well. 
The Court began its analysis, as it had in Preferred Communications, by 
declaring that the activities of both cable programmers and cable operators 
public access requirements, except to note that the claims of unconstitutionality are not frivo-
lous."} (emphasis added). 
108 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
109 [d. at 496. The Court remanded the case so that a more complete factual record could be 
created. 
110 Id. at 494. 
111 Id. (emphasis added). 
112 The Court was similarly opaque five years later in Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 
(1991) when, in upholding a law imposing a sales tax on cable television systems but exempting 
other media, it declared, "Cable television provides to its subscribers news, information, and en-
tertainment. It is engaged in 'speech' under the First Amendment, and is, in much of its opera-
tion part of the 'press.'" It is especially noteworthy that the Court referred to "cable television" 
without indicating whether it was the operators or programmers who were "speaking." 
113 Preferred 1, 476 U.S. at 496 (Blackmun,j., concurring) (emphasis added). 
114 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). 
115 The must-carry rules were imposed in Sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992,47 U.S.C. §§ 534 & 535, Pub. L. 102-385, §§ 4,5, 106 
Stat. 1471, 1477 [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act]. Under the must-carry rules, cable systems must 
provide up to one-third of their channel capacity for carriage of local broadcast stations. 
116 For a discussion of the issues left to be decided on remand, see infra text accompanying 
notes 209-17. 
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were protected by the First Amendment. 117 Noting that "not every interfer-
ence with speech triggers the same degree of scrutiny," the Court declared 
that it "must decide at the outset the level of scrutiny applicable."118 
The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected appeals to analogize cable 
television to either broadcast or print. Instead, the Court ruled that a new 
constitutional standard needed to be created because of the practical tech-
nological differences between cable television and the earlier media. 
Broadcasting cases were deemed inapposite because "cable television 
does not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the broad-
cast medium."119 For this analysis, the Court focused on the number of 
channels which can be carried over fiber optic cables, but did not consider 
the far more limited number of cables which can be accommodated on 
public streets and rights-of-way. Identifying the "fundamental technologi-
cal differences" between broadcasting and cable, the Court concluded that, 
unlike broadcasting, "soon there may be no practical limitation on the 
number of speakers who may use the cable medium."120 
The Court also refused to accept the argument that the selection pro-
cess of cable operators was the same as that of newspaper publishers. As it 
has done with broadcasters, the Court used the phraseology of the publish-
ing world but with a significantly different meaning for electronic commu-
nications.121 The cable operator's act of selecting which programmers 
could use specific channels was described as "exercising editorial discretion 
over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire."122 The Court 
made clear, though, that the "editorial control" of cable operators was not 
to be understood as the fully autonomous decision-making of their print 
counterparts. In stark contrast to the Court's description of newspapers as 
"more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment and adver-
tising,"123 the Court depicted the role of the cable system as essentially that 
of a passive receptacle: "Once the cable operator has selected the program-
ming sources, the cable system junctions, in essence, as a conduit jor the speech oj 
others, transmitting it on a continuous and unedited basis to subscribers."124 
117 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2456; Preferred 1, 476 U.S. at 494. 
118 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2456. 
119 Id. at 2457. 
120 Id. The Court added, "Nor is there any danger of physical interference between two cable 
speakers attempting to share the same channel." Id. The Court also rejected the argument that 
there was a similar "market dysfunction" in broadcast and cable. The Court held that "[a] mere 
assertion of dysfunction or failure in a speech market, without more, is not sufficient to shield a 
speech regulation from the First Amendment standards applicable to non-broadcast media." Id. 
at 2458. 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 69-77. 
122 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2456 (quoting Preferred 1, 476 U.S. at 494). The Court 
stated that the must-carry provisions "interfere with cable operators' editorial discretion by com-
pelling them to offer carriage to a certain minimum number of broadcast stations." Id. at 2460. 
123 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
124 Turner BroadcastingSys., 114 S. Ct. at 2452 (emphasis added). The dissent in Turner Broad-
casting System argued that the "recognition that cable operators are speakers is bottomed in large 
pan on the very fact that the cable operator has editorial discretion." Id. at 2480 (O'Connor,]., 
dissenting). But even the dissent recognized that, because cable operators also serve as a monop-
oly conduit, access requirements would not automatically interfere with "editorial discretion" of 
cable television operators. Though opposing the must-carry rules, the dissent declared that con-
tent-neutral access requirements would not violate the First Amendment: "[I]t stands to reason 
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The recognition that even those cable operators who produce some of 
their own programming serve as conduits for the programs of others led 
the Court to distinguish must-carry rules for cable television from a statute 
mandating a right-of-reply to newspapers. Because of the public's historic 
understanding that newspapers endorse that which they print, a mandated 
right of access to a newspaper could induce "the newspaper to respond to 
the candidate's replies when it might have preferred to remain silent."125 
By contrast, said the Court, cable has long served as "a conduit for broad-
cast signals," so there was little risk that viewers would assume that carriage 
of a broadcaster meant that the cable operator "endorsed" its viewpoint.126 
Cable television's simultaneous role as conduit and source was identi-
fied by the Court as the "important technological difference between news-
papers and cable television."127 The Court reasoned that even a monopoly 
newspaper cannot stop local residents from obtaining other publications, 
such as weekly local papers or out-of-town dailies. Newsstands, the postal 
service and even local delivery people would be able to bring other newspa-
pers to "willing recipients in the same locale."128 
Cable television, according to the Court, is different because once a 
consumer subscribes to cable, the "physical connection between the televi-
sion set and the cable network gives the cable operator bottleneck, or gate-
keeper, control over most (if not all) of the television programming that is 
channeled into the subscriber's home."129 The cable operator, by owning 
"the essential pathway for cable speech," has the technological ability to 
"silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch. "130 
The Court concluded that the government is not barred by the First 
Amendment from ensuring that "private interests not restrict, through 
physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of 
information and ideas."131 
The Court did not discuss one of the most important differences be-
tween the print and cable media: their respective relationships with the 
government. Newspapers do not need governmental permission to publish 
or to distribute. The act of publishing is truly "private," and any attempt to 
require a license would be rejected as a throw-back to the Star Chamber. 
By contrast, cable television's use of public streets and rights-of-way has al-
ways tied the industry closely to governmental authorities. Cable operators 
must obtain a franchise before construction can begin, and almost always 
benefit from being the sole franchisee in an area. 
that if Congress may demand that telephone companies operate as common carriers, it can ask 
the same of cable companies .... » [d. 
125 [d. at 2465. This was also the Court's rationale for striking down a rule requiring a utility to 
include in its billing envelope a newsletter from groups critical of the utility'S rates. Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986). 
126 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2466. The Court also stated that viewer confusion 
would be avoided by broadcasters identifYing themselves every hour, as required by federal law. 
!d. 
127 [d. 
128 [d. 
129 [d. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. 
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The Court described this relationship at the beginning of its Turner 
Broadcasting opinion: "The construction of this physical infrastructure en-
tails the use of public rights-of-way and eaSements and often results in the 
disruption of traffic on streets and other public property. As a result, the 
cable medium may depend for its very existence upon express permission from local 
governing authorities."132 Probably because the must-carry rules were im-
posed on cable operators by the federal government, rather than by the 
local authorities who had given them "express permission," the Court did 
not explore the legal significance of this symbiotic relationship.133 At a 
minimum, it would seem to supply an additional justification for upholding 
local regulation, such as public access requirements, designed to maximize 
the number of cable speakers.134 
After rejecting both the print and broadcast model, and finding that 
the must-carry rules were content-neutral and did not pose "inherent dan-
gers to free expression,"135 the Court announced its standard: "[T]he ap-
propriate standard by which to evaluate the constitutionality of must-carry 
is the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restric-
tions that impose an incidental burden on speech."136 . 
This standard originated in United States v. O'Brien,137 which upheld 
the conviction of a war protester who burned his draft card. In rejecting a 
First Amendment challenge to the conviction, the Court stressed that the 
case involved the combination of" 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements. "138 
In what has since become known as the "O'Brien test," the Court an-
nounced its framework for evaluating the regulation of the "nonspeech" 
element: A regulation is constitutional if it is content-neutral, furthers an 
important governmental interest which is "unrelated to the suppression of 
132 [d. at 2451 (emphasis added). 
133 This was one of the principle grounds relied upon by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit in upholding a city's cable franchising system. See Community Communications Co. v. 
City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982): 
To disseminate information, a newspaper need not use public property in the same way 
that a cable operator does .... [A] cable operator must lay the means of his medium 
underground or string it across poles in order to deliver his message .... Some form of 
permission from the government must, by necessity, precede such disruptive use of the 
public domain .... A city needs control over the number of times its citizens must bear 
the inconvenience of having its streets dug up and the best times for it to occur. Thus, 
government and cable operators are tied in a way that government and newspapers are 
not. 
134 See infra note 174. 
135 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2468. For a discussion of the Court's finding of "con-
tent-neutrality," see infra text accompanying notes 195-206. 
136 [d. Although the Supreme Court did not refer to them, some lower courts had begun to 
apply this standard to cable regulation. See, e.g., Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable 
Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1548 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); Erie Telecom-
munications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 599 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aJf'd on other grounds, 853 
F.2d 1084 (3rd Cir. 1988); Carlson v. Village of Union City, 601 F. Supp. 801, 810 (W.D. Mich. 
1985). In striking down earlier versions of the must-carry rules, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia used this intermediate standard, but left open the possibility that a stricter 
standard of review might be more appropriate. Quincy Cable lV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 
1453 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 
835 F.2d 292, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
137 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
138 [d. at 376. 
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free expression"139 and does not "burden substantially more speech than is 
necessary to further the government's legitimate interests."14o 
Significantly, the Court in Turner Broadcasting was applying O'Brien 
even though the regulation was not limited to a non-speech aspect of cable 
television, such as the placing of cables on a public right-of-way.141 Instead, 
the Court was staking out a middle ground for evaluating the permissibility 
of content-neutral cable television regulation, between the historical ex-
tremes of "strict scrutiny" accorded print and the deferential review of 
broadcast regulation. 
Turner Broadcasting will have enormous significance for the emerging 
communications technologies. The rationale given for applying this mid-
dle standard to cable television will help shape the thinking of the constitu-
tionality of all manner of regulation of all types of technology. Essentially, 
the courts should apply the intermediate test to regulation of a new me-
dium if: (1) The regulation is content-neutral and does not give the gov-
ernment potential for censoring unpopular speech or manipulating the 
media to benefit favored speakers; and (2) The owner of the regulated 
means of communication has great control over the access to that medium, 
especially by potential competitors. 
Additionally, courts must take into account the relationship between 
the new media and government. Many of the newer forms of communica-
tions may depend on governmental largesse, either favored use of a gov-
ernmental infrastructure or special financial or technical assistance.142 
Content-neutral regulation of such governmentally-aided media should not 
be subject to strict scrutiny if the regulation merely attempts to prevent a 
private blockage of the free flow of information and ideas through a critical 
pathway of communication. 
B. Classifying Interests 
The Supreme Court agreed with the FCC that each of the three inter-
ests put forth were to be considered important: "(1) preserving the benefits 
of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the wide-
spread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) 
139 Id. at 377. 
140 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). This last requirement is a revision 
of the original O'Brien requirement that the restriction "on alleged First Amendment freedoms is 
no greater than is essentiaf to further the governmental interest. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (emphasis 
added). While this Ward standard is less demanding of the government, it requires a greater 
governmental showing than an earlier Court statement that a regulation is valid if the interest 
"would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 
675, 689 (1985), quoted in Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. The Coun has also stated that the O'Brien test 
"in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner 
restrictions." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984). This stan-
dard upholds regulations provided that they "are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Id. at 
293. 
141 See, e.g., Preferred 1, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
142 See generally Johnathan D. Blake & Lee]. Tiedrich, The National Infcmnation Infrastructure 
Initiative and the Emergence of the Electronic Superhighway, 46 FED. COMM. LJ. 397 (1994). 
1995] UNCOMMON CARRIERS 101 
promoting fair competition in the market for television programming."143 
While the Court referred to these interests as "interrelated,"l44 they are not 
necessarily consistent with one another. In particular, the first interest 
looks disconcertingly backwards, technologically-speaking, while the other 
two show promise of encompassing the emerging communications 
technologies. 
1. Return of the Luddites 
The Court's rationale for "preserving" broadcasting is not wholly satis-
fying, almost implying an interest in nothing more than protecting an ex-
isting industry from the benefits of improved technology. In the early 
nineteenth century, the Luddites, a group of English textile workers, at-
tempted to stop the advent of the Industrial Revolution by destroying the 
new labor-saving textile machines.145 Just as their struggle was short-
sighted, so too is a policy that fails to recognize society's interest in the 
evolving communications technology. ' 
Most troubling is the Court's conclusion that "'protecting noncable 
households from loss of regular television broadcasting service due to com-
petition from cable systems' is an important federal interest. "146 Unlike the 
third interest identified above, the Court is not endeavoring to protect 
broadcasters from unfair competition, but, apparently, from any competi-
tion, even that resulting from simple consumer preference. 
The difficulty with this interest can be seen in the following scenario. 
Suppose that the offerings of cable television programmers were uniformly 
more interesting and more entertaining than those of broadcasters. Ac-
cordingly, every subscriber to cable television only watched non-broadcast 
programming, even though their cable systems provided access to broad-
cast stations as well. With so many of the nation's viewers gone, many 
broadcasters would be economically ruined.147 It is not self-evident that 
there would be a substantial government interest in protecting non-cable 
143 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2469. The interest in preseIVing broadcasting was 
described in the 1992 Cable Act in § 2 (a) (10) ("A primary objective and benefit of our Nation's 
system of regulation of television broadcasting is the local origination of programming. There is 
a substantial governmental interest in ensuring its continuation.") and § 2(a} (12) ("There is a 
substantial governmental interest in promoting the continued availability of such free television 
programming, especially for viewers who are unable to afford other means of receiving program-
ming."). The second interest, in the multiplicity of information sources was described in 
§ 2(a} (6) ("There is a substantial governmental and First Amendment interest in promoting a 
diversity of views provided through multiple technology media.") and § 2(b} (1) (It is Congress' 
policy to "promote the availability to the public of a diversity of views and information through 
cable television and other video distribution media."). The third interest, in combatting unfair 
competition was stated in § 2(a} (17) ("[Cable law] was premised upon the continued existence 
of mandatory carriage obligations for cable systems, ensuring that local stations would be pro-
tected from anticompetitive conduct by cable systems.") and § 2(b)(5} (It is Congress' policy to 
"ensure that cable television operators do not have undue market power vis-i-vis video program-
mers and consumers."). These sections of the 1992 Cable Act are codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521 (a) 
& 521(b} (Supp. V 1993). 
144 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2469. 
145 See generally MALCOLM 1. THoMAS, THE LUDDITES (1970). 
146 Turner Broadcasting S1.s., 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 
U.S. 691, 714 (1984». 
147 This is, after all, one of the premises behind the must-carry rules. 
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households from losing broadcasting service ~ue to such competition from 
cable systems. 
The Court began its defense of this interest by referring to the 1934 
Communications Act policy of allocating free broadcast service so that all 
communities have "an over-the-air source of information and an outlet for 
exchange on matters of local concern."148 The Court then referred to its 
1968 decision which declared that "the importance of local broadcasting 
outlets 'can scarcely be exaggerated, for broadcasting is demonstrably a 
principal source of information and entertainment for a great part of the 
Nation's population."'149 In reaffirming the contemporary importance of 
"[t]he interest in maintaining the local broadcast structure," the Court re-
ferred to the "nearly 40 percent of American households" which do not 
have cable service and which "rely on broadcast stations as their exclusive 
source of television programming."150 
The most questionable aspect of this analysis is the presumption, with-
out elaboration, that it is the actual "structure" of local broadcasting which 
must be preserved in order for non-cable households to continue to have 
access to their "principal source of information and entertainment." Re-
gardless of the contemporary benefits of broadcasting, the current struc-
ture of local broadcasting was created in a long-gone era and should not be 
permitted to constrict the growth of newer technologies. 
As the FCC has noted, "The existing TV system was cast ... in 1952,"151 
when the Commission established a system for the allotment of broadcast 
signalS.152 This system was based on the premise that only an extremely 
limited number of outlets for programming to the home were physically 
possible: "[I]t was essential for the Government to tell some applicants that 
they could not broadcast at all because there was room for only a few. "153 
In 1965, the FCC proudly announced that it was "creating an assign-
ment plan with our own Univac III computer."I54 The Commission mar-
veled at the "speed with which a computer can perform intricate 
computations and examine stored data ... heretofore considered impracti-
cal because of the time involved."155 The new computer-generated plan 
provided that "over 90 percent of all TV homes should have access to three 
or more television services."156 
148 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2469. 
149 Id. (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968». 
150 Id. at 2469-70 (emphasis added). 
151 VHF TV Top 100 Markets, 63 F.C.C.2d 840, 847 (1977). 
152 See Television Assignments, Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952). 
153 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). Thus, one of the main 
priorities of the 1952 system was to "provide each community with at least two television broad-
cast stations.» Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. at 167. Based on then existing technology, the FCC 
had concluded that: 
[its] objectives of providing for a system of competitive nationwide television service 
reaching all parts of the country with the largest possible number of program choices 
and providing for as many outlets of local expression as possible within the available 
spectrum space ... can best be met by utilizing the 12 VHF and 70 UHF television 
channels in a freely intermixed system. 
VHF Television Expansion, Fourth Repon and Order, 41 F.C.C 1082, 1083 (1965). 
154 Fostering Expanded Use of VHF Television Channels, 41 F.C.C. at 1085. 
155 Id. at 1084. 
156 Id. at 1090. 
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While there has been a bit of tinkering with the allocation of the spec-
trum,157 the television broadcast structure has not been seriously altered. 
In the interim, of course, there has been a video revolution, with cable 
television bringing anywhere from 36 to 120 channels into American 
homes. As the FCC itself noted, "The growth and development of the elec-
tronic communications mass media industry, in both broadcast and non-
broadcast sectors . . . has benefited the public by providing greatly in-
creased amounts and diversity of program choices."158 
Without denigrating the value of broadcast television in general, the 
exact structure of the broadcast regulatory scheme which was created in 
the 1950s is no longer indispensable to the public interest. Even the FCC, 
that staunch defender of the must-carry rules, has recognized the change. 
Prior to the expansion of video options, the utilization of each broad-
cast slot was viewed as essential for giving viewers a modicum of choice.159 
The fear of losing a single station was so great that, under the so-called 
Carroll doctrine,160 an existing broadcaster could block the FCC from 
awarding a new broadcast license to a potential competing broadcaster if it 
could show that "the economic effect of a Second License in ... [an] area 
would be to damage or destroy service to an extent inconsistent with the 
public interest."161 In 1988, the FCC repealed the Carroll doctrine, con-
cluding that the realities of the new communications marketplace makes 
such protectionism unnecessary and unwise.162 The Commission noted 
that not only is competition between speakers inherently good,163 there is 
no longer an appreciable danger of a significant loss in electronic commu-
nications even if "ruinous competition" between broadcasters were to re-
SUlt. l64 As the FCC concluded, "[T]he multiplicity of media voices that 
now exist makes the amount of harm that would result minimal."165 
The changes in the video communications universe have eliminated 
the need to view the benefits of broadcasting as resulting from an indivisi-
ble and inflexible permanent structure that must be defended against all 
157 For example, channels 70-83 were taken away from broadcast television and allocated to 
land mobile radio. An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MH2, 46 
F.C.C.2d 752,793 (1974). 
158 Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broadcast Stations on Existing 
Stations, 3 F.C.C.R. 638, 641 (1988) [hereinafter Detrimental Effects]. 
159 See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943) ("Suppose, for example, that a 
community can, because of physical limitation, be assigned only two stations .... One man, finan-
cially and technically qualified, might apply for and obtain the licenses of both stations and pres-
ent a single service over the two stations, thus wasting a frequency otherwise available to the 
area."). 
160 The Carroll doctrine was named after the case in which the courts first ordered the FCC to 
consider the issue of detrimental economic effect: Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 
(D.C. Cir. 1958). 
161 [d. at 443. 
162 Detrimental Effects, 3 F.C.C.R. at 638. 
163 See, e.g., Table of Television Channel Allotments, 83 F.C.C.2d 51, 55 (1980) ("In general, 
it is in the public interest for the Commission to promote opportunities for additional service to 
the American public. Increasing the number of television competitors is likely to (1) put pres-
sure on competitors to be more responsive to the wants and needs of consumers, (2) increase the 
total amount of service available to consumers, and (3) increase the diversity of service offered."). 
164 Detrimental Effects, 3 F.C.C.R. at 640. 
165 [d. at 641. 
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comers.166 The regulatory system should permit, if not encourage, vigor-
ous competition for the hearts, minds and dollars of the American public. 
The competition must be fair, but regulators should follow the maxim long 
applied to antitrust laws: regulation is designed for "the protection of com-
petition, not competitors."167 
Unfortunately, politicians and regulators can confuse the two. In pass-
ing the 1992 Cable Act, Congress justified the imposition of the must-carry 
requirements as being necessary "to protect the federal system of television 
allocations and promote competition in local markets."168 These are not 
synonymous; mere protection of the broadcast allocation system should no 
longer be viewed as an "important" governmental interest, in and of itself 
sufficient to hinder a newer technology. A system designed for the Univac 
should not restrict communications in a multi-media world. 
Creation of a new system would neither spell the end of the must-carry 
rules, in particular, nor the federal regulation of broadcasters more gener-
ally. Instead, it would force the government to direct its attention where it 
belongs: to encouraging both a multiplicity of electronic voices and fair 
competition among those voices. 
2. Promoting and Protecting the Electronic Marketplace of Ideas 
The Court's discussion in Turner Broadcasting of the government's in-
terests in assuring "a multiplicity of information sources ... [and] eliminat-
ing restraints on fair competition"169 was refreshingly brief, reflecting the 
unanimity of Court support. Nonetheless, each interest has enormous sig-
nificance for the future of electronic communications. 
In a single paragraph, the Court dispatched both issues. The Court's 
analysis of the fair competition issue consisted of just one sentence, which 
declared that the Government's interest in "eliminating restraints on fair 
competition is always substantial" even when applied to the press.170 
166 See, e.g., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309,313 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing the 
FCC's decision to end limitations on the broadcast networks' ability to syndicate their own pro-
gramming as "a remarkable about-face for an agency that for half a century has treated the in-
dependent television stations as sensitive plants requiring high fences to keep out network 
predators.") . 
167 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
168 H.R. Rep. No. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1992), reprinted in 138 CONGo REc. H8308, 
H8327 (Sept. 14, 1992). 
169 TUT7!eT Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2470. The interest in preserving broadcasting was 
described in the 1992 Cable Act in § 2(a) (10) ("A primary objective and benefit of our Nation's 
system of regulation of television broadcasting is the local origination of programming. There is 
a substantial governmental interest in ensuring its continuation.") and § 2(a) (12) ("There is a 
substantial governmental interest in promoting the continued availability of such free television 
programming, especially for viewers who are unable to afford other means of receiving program-
ming."). The second interest, in the multiplicity of information sources was described in 
§ 2(a) (6) ("There is a substantial governmental and First Amendment interest in promoting a 
diversity of views provided through multiple technology media.") and § 2(b)(l) ("[Policy to] 
promote the availability to the public ofa diversity of views and information through cable televi-
sion and other video distribution media"). The third interest, in combatting unfair competition 
was stated in § 2(a)(17) ("[Cable law] premised upon the continued existence of mandatory 
carriage obligations for cable systems, ensuring that local stations would be protected from an-
ticompetitive conduct by cable systems") and § 2(b)(5) ("[Policy to] ensure that cable television 
operators do not have undue market power vis-a-vis video programmers and consumers"). 
170 TUT7!eT Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2470. 
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In almost as short order, the Court characterized increasing the 
number of information sources as a governmental purpose "of the highest 
order" because it "promotes values central to the First Amendment."171 
The Court concluded its succinct discussion by declaring that "it has long 
been a basic tenet of national communications policy that the widest possi-
ble dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is 
essential to the welfare of the public. "172 
These principles are not limited to any particular form of communica-
tions technology. In fact, as Judge Learned Hand declared, it is one of the 
"most vital of all general interests" to have "the dissemination of news from 
as many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is 
possible .... [R]ight conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a 
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection."173 
One of the hallmarks of the new communications technology is the 
potential for opening the electronic medium so that mass communications 
can refer not only to a "mass" of recipients, but to a "mass" of speakers as 
well. More channels or more networks, though, are not enough. The 
promise of the First Amendment can only be realized if the "multitude of 
tongues" over the new technology can speak free of "any kind of authorita-
tive selection." 
IV. FREE SPEECH AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF IDEAS IN THE NEW MEDIA 
The information superhighway promises to become a crowded thor-
oughfare. More sources will be providing information electronically than 
ever before. Those who want to create information will inevitably run into 
conflict with those whose function it is to distribute information. 
Regardless of the ultimate structure of the communications system, 
there will inevitably be some governmental involvement in the resolution 
of many of these conflicts. Historically, the government has played para-
doxical roles, sometimes limiting the discretion of distributors to censor 
others, and sometimes mandating or encouraging the silencing of 
speakers. 
The First Amendment will control both types of involvement. First, in 
what ways can the government encourage diversity by limiting the ability of 
particular distributors to control the speakers they carry? Second, when do 
governmental actions and rules impermissibly transform the private selec-
tion decisions of a distributor into unconstitutional censorship? 
A. Multiplying Speakers by Regulating Distributors 
The Turner Broadcasting decision dealt only with the ability of broad-
casters to obtain access to a cable television system. There have been, and 
undoubtedly will be, other governmental attempts to limit the ability of 
171 Id. 
172 Id. (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668, n.27 (1972) (plural-
ity opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted». 
173 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326 U.S. 1 
(1944). 
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distributors to deny carriage to unaffiliated speakers. For example, Con-
gress and local governments have also provided for the ability of other pro-
grammers to use cable television, via leased and public access 
requirements. Some states have required telephone companies to provide 
dial-it services on a lottery basis. As for broadband networks, there will 
likely be calls for some open access to the backbone system. 
For regulation of the new media to be constitutional, it will have to 
undergo a two-step analysis. First, the distributor must be evaluated to de-
termine if it is a bottleneck with the ability to "restrict, through physical 
control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of informa-
tion and ideas."174 If so, the regulation will then have to pass the O'Brien175 
test as a content-neutral requirement, which furthers an important govern-
mental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression and does 
not burden substantially more speech than is necessary.176 
1. Recognizing Bottlenecks 
Access regulation is most appropriate for distributors who operate as 
"gatekeepers," effectively controlling which speakers can utilize a given me-
dium. In determining whether the owner of a given distribution system 
exercises such control, courts should examine practical real-world realities, 
rather than theoretical possibilities for alternate delivery options. 
In Turner Broadcasting. the Supreme Court found that cable was a bot-
tleneck, even though other options exist for cable subscribers to receive 
broadcast programming. First, as one appellant told the Court, "cable sub-
scribers could receive broadcast signals not carried on cable if they so de-
sired by using an inexpensive input selector or 'A/B' switch."177 Second, 
"most, if not virtually all, communities have the room-on utility poles or 
below ground-to accommodate the construction of additional cable 
systems."178 
174 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2466. This analysis deliberately omits the different 
issue where a distributor has some, but not bottleneck, control and the government imposing the 
requirements has provided significant assistance to the distributor. While this alternativejustifi-
cation was not specified in Turner Broadcasting, it is certainly implied by the Court's reference to 
cable as being dependent "for its very existence upon express permission from local governing 
authorities." [d. at 2452. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35. A more deferential standard 
than O'Brien may, in fact, be appropriate when the government is attempting to level the commu-
nications playing field which the government itself has tilted toward the distributor. See, e.g., Red 
Lion Broadcastingv. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969) (stating that the Fairness Doctrine is justified, 
even if additional stations are possible, because "existing broadcasters [have] a substantial advan-
tage over new entrants [which is] the fruit of a preferred pOSition conferred by the 
Government.") . 
175 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
176 See supra text accompanying notes 136-40. 
177 Brief for Appellant Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. at 8 n.22, Turner Broadcasting System 
(No. 93-44). In 1986, the FCC had envisioned that there would be no need for must carry rules, 
once the public became aware of the existence of AlB switches, because such a switch "guaran-
tee[s] effective viewer choice between local and cable shows." Century Communications Corp. v. 
FCC, 835 F.2d 292,296 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988). 
178 Brief for Appellant National Cable Television, Inc. at 3, Turner Broadcasting System (No. 93-
44). See also Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir.) 
(finding that the infrastructure of Los Angeles can support a second cable system), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 2738 (1994). 
1995] UNCOMMON CARRIERS 107 
Despite these possible means for alternate delivery of broadcast sig-
nals, the Court found that cable operators, as a practical matter, had "phys-
ical control of a critical pathway of communication," and could "silence the 
voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch."179 While the 
Court held that the mere "dysfunction or failure in a speech market,"180 is 
insufficient to justify regulation when that disfunctioning is caused by "pri-
vate power over a central avenue of communication,"181 regulation to pro-
tect the market is permissible. 
Most computer networks will not possess such power. If one is dissatis-
fied with the policy of Prodigy, for example, there are not only large net-
works, such as CompuServe and America Online, but hundreds of smaller 
ones available on the Internet.182 Owners of networks should have the 
right to define how their networks will be used. There is no reason to 
mandate that each network serve as a common carrier. As long as there are 
other networks freely available, the First Amendment is served when com-
panies have the freedom to decide what type of messages they will carry, 
from establishing a "family" network to a bulletin board dealing exclusively 
with tobacco.183 An abundance of different types of networks would seem 
to further, not deter, free expression. 
The only exception to this would be if the government were to some-
how grant, or permit, a single entity the power to control who could utilize 
a major network backbone, be it the Internet or some later incarnation. 
Such control would create an unacceptable ability for private restriction of 
"a critical pathway of communication." 
Telephone companies have traditionally been viewed as the paradig-
matic gatekeeper. The role of telephone companies has been radically 
transformed in the last quarter-century. The entry ofMCI and the break-up 
of AT&T helped divide the monolithic telephone service into competitive 
long-distance and monopoly local service.184 The services offered by the 
local companies became further subdivided into monopoly basic service 
and unregulated "enhanced service. "185 The future will bring further per-
mutations, though their ultimate make-up is far from certain. 
179 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2466. 
180 Id. at 2458. 
181 Id. 
182 See generally Angela J. Campbell, Political Campaigning in the Information Age: A Proposal for 
Protecting Political Candidates' Use of On-Line Computer Services, 38 VILL. L. REv. 517, 519-22 & nn.ll, 
14 (1993). 
183 See, e.g.,John Schwartz, Internet Newsgroup Intrusion has Tobacco Wags Smokin' Mad, WASHING-
TON POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at F21 ("By bringing their divergent points of view into contact, smokers 
and nonsmokers alike sharpen their debating skills and learn more about the other side's point 
of view."). Other specialized services include health care, medieval history and cats. See, e.g., 
PeterH. Lewis, Anarchy, a Threat on the Electronic Frontier?, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,1994, at D1; see also 
Steve Lohr, Who Will Control the Digital Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1973, § 4, at 1 (describing a 
bulletin board dedicated to Beverly Hills 90210). 
184 See, e.g., Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969); United 
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aJfd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 
1001 (1983). Even the local telephone monopoly seems destined to be ending, as cable compa-
nies prepare to offer local phone service. See generally Tim Greene, Cable Firms Creep Towards 
IWllout of Local-Loop Sevice, NETWORK WORLD, Sept. 11, 1995, at 1. 
185 Amendment of Section 64.702 of Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer 
Inquiry), 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 54-55 (1980). 
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As long as a telephone distributor dominates a geographic area, public 
policy demands that equal access be available. The mere technical possibil-
ity of bypass technology or alternate means of carriage should be insuffi-
cient. Even the existence of a few alternate carriers does not prevent the 
private abuse of power. IS6 Oligopolies are not substantially safer than mo-
nopolies for safeguarding the First Amendment rights of speakers.IS7 
When a telephone company is given discretion over sub-categories of 
service, care must be taken to ensure that practical alternatives exist for 
speakers. For example, "dial it services," which permit many callers to re-
ceive information simultaneously from a message provider, are considered 
an "enhanced service."ISS Telephone companies are generally free to de-
cide whether or not to collect fees for such message providers.1s9 When 
telephone companies have chosen to refuse to collect fees for certain 
message providers, usually the so-called Dial-a-Porn services,190 courts have 
occasionally misunderstood the issues being raised. The question is not 
the desirability of controlling "indecent" services, but whether it is the job 
of the private telephone company to make that decision. 
In permitting a telephone company to bar indecent programming 
from its dial-it service offerings, one court held that because the service 
went to many listeners simultaneously, "[t]he phone company resembles 
less a common carrier than it does a small radio station. "191 Accordingly, 
the court reasoned, the phone company could "edit" these services. This 
analysis confused the issue of speaker versus distributor selection. A "small 
radio station" speaks itself over its single assigned frequency; it is not a 
conduit for hundreds of other services. If there is any such analogy to be 
made, it is the service provider who is "broadcasting" like a radio station, 
while the telephone company is functioning as the "ether" through which 
messages are transmitted. , 
If, indeed, the telephone company were deemed to be "speaking" 
when it carried the information services of others, there could be a signifi-
cant danger to free speech. Michigan Bell, for instance, issued a policy 
barring any service it determined to be "inflammatory, and likely to offend 
ethnic, gender, racial or religious groups; lewd, lascivious, indecent or ob-
186 See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(stating that non-monopoly long-distance telephone companies were still common carriers). 
187 See, e.g., Michael Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable Teleuision Op"ator: An Unpro-
tective Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 COMM./ENT. 1, 10 (1981) (describing cable televi-
sion as a "natural oligopoly"). 
188 Second Computer Inquiry, 84 F.C.C.2d at 54-55. 
189 See, e.g., Network Communications v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 703 F. Supp. 1267, 1269 (E.D. 
Mich. 1989) (stating that the tariffs of the Michigan Public Utility Commission "do not require 
[Michigan Bell] to provide billing services for such programs, but rather leave such decisions to 
be set as a matter of business policy by the telephone company"); Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. 
Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1543 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that New York's Public Service Commis-
sion "has adopted no rule requiring the telephone company to provide billing and collection 
services") em. denied sub nom. Dial Info. Servs. v. Barr, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992). 
190 "Dial-a-porn is a widely understood shorthand expression to describe a telephone 'infor-
mation service' that offers sexually-oriented messages, recorded or live, to callers for a fee." Infor-
mation Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 869 (9th 
Cir.1991). 
191 Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th 
Cir. 1987), cm. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988). 
1995] UNCOMMON CARRIERS 109 
scene; ... or likely to have a detrimentaJ effect on Michigan Bell's image or 
reputation. "192 If the wires of Michigan Bell were the only way for an infor-
mation provider to offer services, or even if it were only the most effi-
cient,193 a private corporation would be able to exercise substantial control 
over this avenue of communication. 
If, on the other hand, there are many realistic alternatives for the pro-
viding of such services, the refusal of the phone company to carry a particu-
lar provider would not seriously impede the ability of the provider to be 
heard. The mere theoretical availability of alternatives is irrelevant. But if 
it can be shown that information services can be provided practically and 
efficiently either through the local system with an alternate billing 
method,194 or through long-distance carriers,195 the selection decision of a 
telephone company on its billing plan will not raise the same censorial 
threat. 
2. Content Neutrality 
It is imperative that any governmentaJ involvement in the new media 
technologies be content-neutral. Irrespective of the means of communica-
tion involved, "it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that govern-
men~ remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas."196 
In Turner Broadcasting, the Court found the must-carry rules to be con-
tent-neutral. Most notably, the Court held that encouraging a diversity of 
information sources was a permissible, content-neutral purpose,197 even 
though that purpose is arguably "tied to the content of what the speakers 
will likely say. "198 
The must-carry rules were found to be content-neutral because they 
were viewed as mandating carriage by a distributor, rather than regulating 
a speaker. In Riley v. Nationa,lFederation ojthe Blind,199 the Court held that a 
North Carolina law requiring professional fund raisers to disclose to poten-
tial contributors the percentage of gross revenue turned over to charity was 
subject to strict scrutiny because it was not content-neutral: "Mandating 
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the con-
192 Robert M. Pepper, Through the Looking Glass: Integrated Broadband Networks, Regulatory Poli-
cies, and Institutional Change 66 (OPP Working Paper No. 24; Office of Plans and Policy, FCC, 
November 1988) (on file with author). U.S. West has a similar policy, barring billing for informa-
tion selVices which "cause harm to the telephone company's reputation." Henry H. Perritt,Jr., 
Tort Liability, The First Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic Networks, 5 lIARv. J.L. & TECH. 
Spring 1992, at 65, 112. 
193 See Morgan W. Tovey, Dial-a-pom and the First Amendment: The State Action Loophole, 40 FED. 
COMM. LJ. 267, 288 n.115 (1988) (stating that "rolf course, callers living in, for example, the 
region controlled by Mountain Bell could access dial-a·porn messages in Pacific Bell's region, but 
toll charges may be prohibitively expensive"). 
194 Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and en bane 
reh'ggranted, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en bane), petition/or 
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 21, 1995) (No. 95-124). 
195 Audio Enterprises, Inc., 3 F.C.C.R 7233, 7238 (1988). 
196 FCC v. Pacific Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978). 
197 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2469-70. 
198 Id. at 2477 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). 
199 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
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tent of the speech. We therefore consider [the requirement] a content-
based regulation of speech."20o 
The must-carry rules, by contrast, did not affect the cable operator as 
"speaker" but as carrier.201 The rules, according to the Court, "reduce the 
number of channels over which cable operators exercise unfettered con-
trol."202 Increasing the total number of voices carried by a distributor is 
content-neutral, said the Court, because it does not "favor or disadvantage 
speech of any particular content."203 
Equally important, the must-carry rules pursued their purpose without 
regard to the content of speech. The Court noted that, in contradistinc-
tion to the right-of-reply law struck down in Tornillo, the must-carry require-
ments were neither triggered by statements made by the cable operator nor 
limited to helping those speakers who will "counterbalance" the cable oper-
ator's message. The law applied to cable operators and broadcasters re-
gardless of any point of view expressed or subject matter covered.204 
Additionally, the Court stated that the mandated carriage of the 
broadcasters' messages would not cause cable operators to alter their own 
messages in response. Because the operators were serving merely as con-
duits to broadcasters' speech, mandatory distribution of the programming 
of others could not be equated to "compel[ling] cable operators to affirm 
points of view with which they disagree.''205 Also, because unlike the right-
of-reply, there is no content-based "trigger" to the must-carry rules, they 
will not cause an operator to avoid presenting controversial opinions or 
programming. 
Any rules designed to enhance diversity over the new technology must 
be similarly content-neutral. They must not mirror the old Fairness Doc-
trine and be triggered by particular statements or opinions.206 Nor can 
they be limited to proponents or opponents of any particular viewpoint. 
Second, to avoid the risk of "forced response," the medium and the access 
rules must be such that the "carrier" is not made to appear to agree with 
the "speakers'" messages.207 
These conditions will likely be met by broad based access rules, such as 
public access for cable television or common carriage for a telephone com-
pany or computer network. Such rules are content-neutral. By granting 
access to many speakers, the rules ensure that the "conduit" cannot reason-
ably be viewed as endorsing the messages of each. Moreover, the kind of 
identification requirement cited by the Court for broadcasters to distin-
200 Id. at 795 (emphasis added). 
201 Turner BroadcastingSys., 114 S. Ct. at 2460 (stating that "the extent of the interference does 
not depend upon the content of the cable operators' programming"). 
202 Id. at 2456. 
203 Id. at 2464 (emphasis added). 
204 See id. at 2460 (stating that "an operator cannot avoid or mitigate its obligations under the 
Act by altering the programming it offers to subscribers."). 
205 Id. at 2462. 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 72-73. 
207 Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (stating that a 
utility might "feel compelled to respond to arguments and allegations made by [the group] in its 
messages .... [This] kind offorced response is antithetical to the free discussion the First Amend-
ment seeks to foster."). 
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guish their message from the cable .operator could easily be applied to any 
speaker being granted access to these electronic media.208 
3. Finding a Reasonable Fit 
While the Court in Turner Broadcasting upheld the importance of the 
governmental interests behind the must-carry rules, the case was remanded 
for a determination of whether the rules would actually advance those in-
terests.209 To determine the need for the rules, the lower court was di-
rected to make factual findings as to whether broadcast stations will be 
dropped from cable systems without must-carry rules, and whether 
dropped stations would suffer substantial economic harm.210 
This demand for a fuller record reflects the medium-level scrutiny of 
O'Brien. Even though Congress made a general finding as to both issues,211 
the Court was required to provide "meaningful judicial review," to assure 
that "Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial 
evidence. "212 
This is an appropriate message for any regulator, especially in the 
realm of communications. Even when regulating a distributor, the govern-
ment should assure that there is a need for the regulation and that there is 
solid evidentiary support for its prediction that the regulation will serve the 
need.213 
The must-carry remand also contained some potentially confusing lan-
guage. The lower court was directed to determine the "actual effect" of 
must-carry rules on cable operators and programmers, including how cable 
operators are changing their programming selection, how many program-
mers were dropped from cable systems, and how many cable systems are 
able to utilize unused channel capacity to carry broadcasters.214 A plurality 
stated that this information was needed because "unless we know the ex-
tent to which the must-carry provisions in fact interfere with protected 
speech, we cannot say whether they suppress 'substantially more speech 
than ... necessary' to ensure the viability of broadcast television."215 
The particular factual inquiry ordered, however, will not reveal 
whether the rules suppress substantially more speech than necessary. Even 
assuming this determination can be made free of self-serving efforts to in-
208 See Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2466; see also supra note 126. 
209 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2469-70. This portion of the opinion was signed by 
only four Justices: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, BIackmun and Souter. 
210 Id. at 247l. 
211 See, e.g., Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, § 2 (a) (16), 47 U.S.C. 
§ 521 (Supp. 1993). 
212 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2471 (plurality opinion). 
213 See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(striking down ban on telephone company ownership of co-located cable system because of the 
less burdensome alternatives for preventing telephone domination of video services, such as a 
common carrier requirement for some, though not all, of the telephone company's video chan-
nels), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995). See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS 
REFORM 184 (1982) (stating that "regulators ought to aim at worst cases and that, in attacking such 
cases, they should strive for simplicity.") 
214 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2472 (plurality opinion). 
215 Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989». 
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fluence the factual resolution,216 the record will only show the amount of 
interference, not whether that amount is rnnre than necessary. The last ele-
ment of the O'Brien test is not a balancing test, asking whether the interfer-
ence with speech is "too much." Instead, the element requires the 
government not to utilize a method for advancing its interests when there 
are equally effective means which are less intrusive on First Amendment 
interests. 
Thus, for this determination on remand to be meaningful, the amount 
of interference caused by the must-carry rules will have to be compared 
with the amount of interference caused by some other regulatory alterna-
tive which would serve the government's purposes equally well. This is best 
understood by the plurality's final directive for the lower court to provide 
'Judicial findings concerning the availability and efficacy of 'constitution-
ally acceptable less restrictive means' of achieving the Government's as-
serted interests."217 
Regulators should not have to "balance" the needs of speakers with the 
"effect" on distributors. It is perfectly acceptable for the government to 
determine that speakers are more important. Regulators should, however, 
be prepared to show that there is no equally effective way to help speakers 
which would be less intrusive on the selection process of distributors. 
B. Unconstitutional Influences on Distributars 
1. Direct State Action 
The Constitution, though only limiting the actions of governmental 
entities, applies to private decisions when the government "has exercised 
coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either 
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the 
State."218 Nonetheless, there seems to be an unfortunate belief by some 
government officials that it is not really censorship if the government 
forces a private distributor to silence a speaker. While the courts have been 
able to turn back many of the attempts to create governmentally-led private 
censors, their repeated recurrence is cause for concern. 
For example, in 1985, Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph began 
carriage of a dial-a-porn service on its "dial-a-message" network.219 A dep-
uty attorney from Maricopa County, Arizona wrote to the telephone com-
pany advising it to terminate the service and threatening to prosecute the 
phone company for distributing sexually explicit material to minors if it 
did not comply.22o It should come as no surprise that the telephone com-
216 As Justice Stevens noted, the remand "may actually invite the parties to adjust their con-
duct in an effort to affect the result of this litigation (perhaps by opting to drop cable programs 
rather than seeking to increase total channel capacity)." Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 
2475 (Stevens, j., concurring). 
217 Id. at 2472 (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989». 
218 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,1004-05 (1982); see a~oJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345, 356 (1974). 
219 Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Corp., 827 F.2d 1291, 1292 
(9th Cir. 1987), em. denied, 480 U.S. 1029 (1988). 
220 Id. at 1295. 
1995] UNCOMMON CARRIERS 113 
pany reacted by immediately sending a termination notice to the program-
ming service.221 
Similarly, the New York Police Department Public Morals Squad con-
tacted executives of Manhattan Cable Television, the cable television fran-
chisee for Manhattan, to express "concern" about the portrayal of sexual 
acts on the programming supplied by a leased access programmer.222 The 
cable company subsequently began ordering the programmer to delete 
certain material, even though it had permitted the same material earlier.223 
As these instances illustrate, there are even greater dangers to the First 
Amendment when distributors are forced to censor speakers than when 
the government is censoring speakers directly. First, the speakers are sub-
ject to being silenced at the whim of an intimidated private party, lacking 
expertise and training in drawing the fine line between protected and un-
protected speech. As was aptly stated by the court which struck down a 
1976 FCC requiremept that cable operators censor obscene and indecent 
public access programming, "Thus the Commission made the cable opera-
tor both judge andjury, and subjected the cable user's First Amendment 
rights to decision by an unqualified private citizen, whose personal interest 
in satisfying the Commission enlists him on the 'safe' side-the side of 
suppression. "224 
The second danger in mandating distributor censorship is that the 
censorial decisions are made absent any of the safeguards which the 
Supreme Court has imposed on the government. Since the 1965 case of 
Freedman v. Maryland,225 the Court has required the following system to be 
in place before prior restraints are permitted: 
First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that 
the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any re-
straint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief 
period and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a 
prompt final judicial determination must be assured.226 
When an information provider is barred from using a telephone ser-
vice or an access programmer is prevented from offering a particular pro-
gram on a cable television system, there is a restraint imposed prior to 
speech. When that restraint is imposed by "a corps of involuntary govern-
ment[al] surrogates, "227 it must- be struck down as an unconstitutional 
prior restraint. 
Sometimes, the distributor has been not an "involuntary" government 
surrogate, but an all-too-willing co-conspirator in the silencing of speakers. 
Nonetheless, the Constitution would be violated if a private distributor and 
221 Id. at 1293. 
222 Diane L. Hofbauer, "Cablepom" and the First Amendment: Perspectives on Content Regulation of 
Cable Television, 35 FED. COMM. LJ. 139, 189 (1983). 
223 Id. 
224 Midwest VuIeo II, 571 F.2d 1025, 1057 (8th Gir. 1978), affd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 
(1979). 
225 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
226 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975) (summarizing Freed-
man, 380 U.S. at 58-59). 
227 Midwest Vufeo II, 571 F.2d at 1056. 
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a government official "somehow reached an understanding to deny" speak-
ers their First Amendment rights.228 
In Kansas City, for example, the cable operator and the city both 
wanted to prevent the Ku Klux Klan from using the public access chan-
ne1.229 The president of the local cable company wrote to the City Council 
saying that while the company was unable to prohibit access programming 
which was "morally offensive ... to the City Council's constituents," a mem-
ber of the Council had "suggested" that the city eliminate the franchise 
provision requiring public access.230 In exchange, the cable operator 
pledged to "accommodate" current public access progranimers on its own 
local channe1.231 A few hours after the operator's letter was received, a 
resolution to abolish public access in Kansas City was introduced into the 
City Council, and enacted shortly thereafter. This was an interesting ploy, 
since the elimination of the access channel by the city was, at least on its 
face, content-neutral. The actual barring of the Klan was left to the private 
cable operator. Nonetheless, this arrangement was found to be subject to 
constitutional constraints because the city and cable operator "engaged in 
joint action designed to suppress free speech ... [which forms] a cogniza-
ble claim under the state action doctrine."232 
A subtler form of joint action is embodied in Section 10 of the 1992 
Cable Act, permitting cable operators to prohibit indecent programming 
on access channels.233 The FCC, in its rulemaking implementing this sec-
tion, concluded that this authorization was constitutional.234 The FCC put 
great stock in its conclusion that access channels were not "public fora" but 
were "common carriers."235 The Commission made the extraordinary 
statement that, as common carriers, cable operators could censor constitu-
tionally protected speech because "public utilities, such as telephone com-
mon carriers ... engag[e] in content-based discrimination."236 
It is almost unbelievable that the agency charged with primary control 
over communications common carriage in the United States could put 
forth such a proposition. Even if cable television access is viewed "only" as 
a common carrier service, such services are not permitted to pick and 
228 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). 
229 Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989). 
230 Id. at 1350. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 1354. Kansas City eventually agreed to reinstate the public access channel and pay 
$100,000 in attorney fees; see Kansas City Reinstates Public Access Channe~ MULTICHANNEL NEWS,July 
24, 1989, at 1; Kansas City Caves in to Klan Claim, KAGAN CABLE TV LAw REp., Aug. 29, 1989, at 9. 
233 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 
§ 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. V 1993». This section 
was initially struck down by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, but 
subsequently upheld by the court sitting en banco Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 
812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and en bane reh g granted, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 56 F.3d 
105 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), petition JOT cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 21, 1995) (No. 
95-124). Other courts, though, still find the prOvision constitutionally suspect. See Goldstein v. 
Manhattan Cable TV, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 4750 (LBS), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13716 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
20, 1995); Altmann v. Television Signal Corp., 849 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
234 See Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act 
of 1992,8 F.C.C.R. 998, 999 (1993) (First Report and Order); 8 F.C.C.R. 2638, 2639 (1993) (Sec-
ond Report and Order). 
235 Implementation oj Section 10 (First Report and Order), 8 F.C.C.R. at 100l. 
236 Id. 
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choose which programs to cany.237 While common carriers have tradition-
ally been authorized to bar illegal messages, that has not been construed as 
permission to censor constitutionally protected messages.238 As the Com-
mission itself has repeatedly noted, "[T]he service must be for a lawful pur-
pose, since the only service which a person has the right to demand of a public 
utility is service lawful in character."23~ 
Moreover, public access is more properly understood as a public fo-
rum. The FCC itself has previously characterized public access as "a chan-
nel set aside as a public forum."24o This fits with the Supreme Court's 
definition of a public forum as being created when "the State has opened 
[a forum] for use by the public as a place for expressive activity."241 Access 
channels were so opened by Congress, which defined the channels as "des-
ignated for public ... use,"242 and termed access, "the video equivalent of 
the speaker's soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet."243 
If access channels are to be viewed as public fora, then the government, or 
its authorized private agent, has "an obligation to justify its discriminations 
and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms. "244 
Whatever the characterization of the access channels, the govern-
ment's role in private censorship was unacceptable. Congress very much 
desired cable operators to silence "indecent" access programmers. This de-
termination of governmental purpose does not require the making of un-
certain " [i]nquiries into congressional motives."245 The title of the section, 
"Children's Protection From Indecent Programming on Leased Access 
Channels," proclaims its purpose to block the showing of "indecent" pro-
237 The cases relied on by the FCC, such as Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 
866, 877 (9th Cir. 1991) and Carlin Communications Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 
F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988), dealt with telephone compa-
nies providing enhanced services and not serving as common carriers. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 190-9l. 
238 See, e.g., Pike v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 So. 2d 254 (Ala. 1955) (stating that 
telephone company is liable for wrongful discontinuation of service when it incorrecdy assumed 
telephone was being used for illegal purposes). 
239 Humane Society v. Western Union Int'l Inc., 30 F.C.C.2d 711, 713 (1971) (emphasis ad-
ded). See also Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmis-
sion of Obscene Materials, 2 F.C.C.R. 2819 (1987) (stating that "common carriers have a general 
obligation to hold out their services to the public on a first-come, first-served basis without refer-
ence to content. Most authorities, however, recognize an exception to this general rule which 
gives common carriers the right to prohibit the use of their facilities for an illegal purpose."). 
240 Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning Cable 
Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements, 87 F.C.C.2d 40, 42 (1981). See 
also Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1351-52 (W.D. Mo. 
1989) (holding that, as commonly constituted, access channels are a public forum). 
241 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (alteration ad-
ded). See also International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706 
(1992) (stating that a public forum is created if "a principle purpose" for creating the forum was 
for "public discourse" and "the free exchange of ideas"). 
242 47 U.S.C. § 522 (15) (A) (Supp. V 1993). 
243 H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 4655, 
4667. 
244 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981). 
245 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). 
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gramming.246 This is confirmed by the legislative history.247 The govern-
ment is encouraging and endorsing the ban on indecent access programs. 
Similar governmental encouragement of private action has been held 
to constitute state action. For example, the Supreme Court found state 
action where federal regulations authorized, without requiring, drug test-
ing of employees by private railroads.248 The Court concluded that, by 
"remov[ing] all legal barriers to the testing," indicating "its desire to share 
the fruits of such intrusions" and "pre-empt[ing] state laws ... covering the 
same subject matter," the government had done "more than adopt a pas-
sive position toward the underlying private conduct."249 These factors were 
held to be "clear indices of the Government's encouragement, endorse-
ment, and participation, and suffice to implicate the [Constitution] ."250 
The identical situation is created by Section 10 and the FCC's regula-
tions. First, Congress has wholeheartedly encouraged and endorsed the 
censorship of indecent access programming. Second, Congress and the 
FCC have removed all legal barriers to the cable operator's censorship of 
access. Third, the FCC announced that Section lOis to be read as pre-
empting conflicting state indecency and obscenity laws.251 The govern-
ment has done far more than "adopt a passive position" toward the 
censorship of access programming. A cable operator who censors access 
programming pursuant to the law must "be deemed an agent or instru-
ment of the Government."252 
Legislative and regulatory bodies should not be trying to execute an 
end run around the First Amendment. If the governmental purpose is 
truly legitimate, as in the protection of children, it must pursue its goals in 
a constitutional manner. 
2. Distributor Liability and the Encouragement of Collateral Censorship 
Even when the government is not directly trying to force distributors 
to censor speakers, rules imposing civil and criminal liability on distribu-
tors could have the same censorial effect. When regulating distributors, 
extreme care must be taken to ensure that the reasonably nervous conduit 
is not induced to silence protected speech in the name of prudent business 
decision making. 
246 Even though the title of the section refers to "Leased Access," .the provisions within the 
section are meant to cover both leased and public access. 138 CONGo REc. S642, S648 (dailyed. 
Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
247 The chief sponsor of Section 10, Senator Helms, stated that the purpose of this section was 
to "forbid cable companies from inflicting their unsuspecting subscribers with sexually explicit 
programs." 138 CONGo REc. S642, S646 (daily ed.Jan. 30, 1992). See also id. at S647 (statement of 
Sen. Helms) ("Mr. President, the bottom line is that this amendment will keep decent Americans 
from being victimized by the disgusting programs, and the strip shows, and all the rest [of] the 
sleaze that runs on leased access channels."). 
248 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). The Court stated, "The 
fact that the Government has not compelled a private party to perform a search does not, by 
itself, establish that the search is a private one." Id. at 615. 
249 Id. at 615. 
250 Id. at 615-16. 
251 Implementation of Section 10, First Report and Order; 8 F.C.C.R. 998, 1006-07 nn.42 & 44. 
252 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614-15. 
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Uncertainty over whether particular speech will result in liability will 
frequently result in a speaker opting to avoid the speech altogether. In 
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind,253 the Court explained how a law 
prohibiting professional fund raisers from collecting fees from charities 
that were not "reasonable" would unconstitutionally "reduc[e] the quantity 
of expression":254 . 
[F]undraisers will be faced with the knowledge that every campaign ... 
will subject them to potential litigation over the "reasonableness" of the 
fee. And, of course, in every such case the fundraiser must bear the costs 
of litigation and the risk of a mistaken adverse finding by the factfinder, 
even if the fundraiser and the charity believe that the fee was in fact fair. 
This scheme must necessarily chill speech in direct contravention of the 
First Amendment's dictates.255 
Whether dealing with claims of defamation, copyright infringement, 
indecency or obscenity, the line between illegal and constitutionally pro-
tected speech is difficult to ascertain and often uncertain until the end of 
litigation. Any rule permitting the imposition of liability will threaten 
speakers to some extent. The existence of the rules, though, does not have 
an excessively negative effect on communications, as speakers will presuma-
bly ignore a small risk because of the value they place on communicating 
their own messages. 
By contrast, the factors identified in Riley-fear of potential litigation 
costs and the risk of mistaken adverse rulings-are particularly devastating 
when considering the effect the same liability rules have on a distributor. If 
distributors face a threat of litigation, the speech for which they will be 
liable is not their own, but that of unaffiliated speakers. Distributors have 
no strong personal stake in the communication. 'rhere is no powerful 
political belief or pride of authorship to counterbalance the dangers and 
costs of litigation. If the threat of liability causes rational speakers to cen-
sor themselves and "steer far wider of the unlawful zone,"256 a rational dis-
tributor can be expected to steer far wider still. It simply does not have to 
get very cold to chill the distribution of someone else's speech. 
Thus, it is inappropriate to use the same standard to judge the "effect" 
of a law imposing liability on a distributor as on a speaker. Unfortunately, 
some courts have failed to notice this distinction. After conceding that fear 
of a state obscenity law may cause a telephone company not to carry an 
independent information service, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
clared, "Some self-censorship is an inevitable result of all obscenity laws."257 
253 487 u.s. 781 (1988). 
254 Id. at 794 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976». 
255 Id. at 794; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (stating that 
punishing governmental criticism with only truth as a defense, "dampens the vigor and limits the 
variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments."). 
256 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 
526 (1958». 
257 Carlin Communications Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 827 F.2d 1291, 1297 n.6 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988). See also Implementation a/Section 10 
(First &part and Order), 8 F.C.C.R. at 1001-02 n.22 (stating "Carlin also disposes of ... [the] claims 
that a cable operator's decision to ban indecent programming constitutes state action or an un-
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Similarly, in upholding the imposition on cable operators of liability for 
obscene public and leased access programming, one court stated: 
The danger of self-censorship induced by the ambiguity inherent in the 
concept of obscenity itself has never been held to mandate a constitu-
tional requirement for general immunity from obscenity laws for anyone. 
In other words, no speakers-cable operators included-have a constitu-
tional right to immunity to relieve them of anxiety about crossing the 
threshold from the risque to the obscene.258 
These statements incorrectly characterize what is occurring when a tel-
ephone company drops an independent service provider or a cable opera-
tor bars an access programmer. It is not se?fcensorship at work, because 
the telephone company and cable operator are not censoring their own 
speech. Rather, this phenomenon should be viewed as "collateral censor-
ship," the silencing by a private party of the communication of others. It is 
thus incorrect that the possibility that a distributor "might yield . . . to the 
pressure of an otherwise valid and applicable obscenity law does not con-
vert that law into an unlawful prior restraint."259 When liability rules are 
imposed on distributors for the speech they carry, the fundamental ques-
tion is whether the rules impose such "pressure" on distributors that they 
will be significantly deterred from permitting others to communicate con-
stitutionally protected speech. 
Distributors are "chilled" far more readily than speakers. Even a mar-
ginal risk will chill a distributor. Moreover, a chill on one distributor will 
freeze out hundreds of speakers, deterring far more constitutionally pro-
tected speech than a traditional rule of liability. Rules for distributors need 
to be created, therefore, that are consonant with the First Amendment's 
protections for speech. 
To avoid the dangers of collateral censorship, rules for liability must 
reflect the differences between speakers and distributors. Speakers should 
always be legally responsible for their defamatory or obscene speech. Spe-
cial rules are needed for distributors, though, to ensure that the flow of 
information does not dry to a trickle. 
One court which attempted to make this calibration was Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuSeroe, Inc.,26o the first judicial analysis of the liability of a computer 
network for the communication produced by independent users. Com-
puServe is a network that provides on-line information services. Subscrib-
ers using personal computers obtain access to more than 150 information 
sources, organized into "forums" on particular topics, which include elec-
lawful prior restraint simply because the cable operator potentially could face liability if it carries 
obscene programming."). 
258 Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D. D.C. 1993) (first and 
second emphasis added). 
259 Carlin Communications, 827 F.2d at 1297 n.6. Even the Supreme Court has occasionally 
mischaracterized as self-censorship what is really a threat of collateral censorship created by laws 
imposing liability on bookstores. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 60 
(1989) ("[O]ur cases have long recognized the practical reality that 'any form of criminal obscen-
ity statute applicable to a bookseller will induce some tendency to self-censorship and have some 
inhibitory effect on the dissemination of material not obscene:") (quoting Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1959». 
260 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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tronic bulletin boards, on-line collferences and databases. These "forums" 
are managed not by CompuServe, but by independent contractors.261 Fo-
rum managers then make contracts with numerous information providers. 
One forum, the Journalism Forum, was operated by Cameron Com-
munications, Incorporated (CCI). CCI, in turn, had contracted with Don 
Fitzpatrick Associates (DF A), which published a daily newsletter, Rumnrville 
USA, which provided "reports about broadcast journalism and journal-
ists."262 DFA agreed in its contract to "'accept[ ] total responsibility for the 
contents' of Rumorville."263 
Although the contract for running Rumnrville was between the newslet-
ter's publisher and the network manager, the actual physical link was be-
tween the publisher, DFA, and CompuServe: "DFA uploads the text of 
Rumorville into CompuServe's data banks and makes it available to [Com-
puServe'~] subscribers instantaneously."264 
The owners of a competing computer database, Skuttlebut, which also 
published news and gossip about the world of broadcasting, were angered 
by what they saw as Rumnrville's repeated publication of false and defama-
tory attacks. They sued not only DFA, the producer, of the material, but 
CompuServe, the network which carried it. . 
There is no doubt that if the statements were defamatory, the pro-
ducer would be legally responsible. The question in, the case was whether 
the carrier would also be liable. 
The threshold issue was the determination of the standard of liability 
for computer networks. The court viewed this as a choice of print analo-
gies: whether to treat CompuServe's role as that of "publisher" or "news-
stand." If CompuServe were viewed as the publisher, its responsibility 
would have been identical to that of a newspaper publisher which is liable 
for republishing defamatory articles.265 
Instead, the court ruled that CompuServe should be viewed as "the 
functional equivalent of a more traditional news vendor."266 Even though 
CompuServe has the contractual right to refuse to carry a particular "publi-
cation," according to the court, "in reality, once it does decide to carry a 
publication, it will have little or no editorial control over that publication's 
contents."267 Thus, CompuServe had "no more editorial control over such 
a publication than does a public library, book store, or newsstand, and it 
would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine every publication it 
carries for potentially defamatory statements than it would be for any other 
distributor to do SO."268 
261 The contract required the forum manager to "'manage, reView, create, delete, edit and 
otherwise control the contents' [of the forum] 'in accordance with editorial and technical stan-
dards and conventions of style as established by CompuServe.''' Cuhby, 776 F. Supp. at 137 (quot-
ing Affidavit of Jim Cameron, sworn to on April 4, 1991, Exhibit A). The contract also provided 
that forum managers would indemnity CompuServe for claims resulting from information pub-
lished in the forum. [d. at 143. 
262 [d. at 137. 
263 [d. at 137 (quoting Cameron Affidavit, Exhibit B). 
264 [d. at 140. 
265 See, e.g., Gertz v. Roben Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
266 Cuhby, 776 F. Supp. at 140. 
267 [d. 
268 [d. 
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Placing a duty on a computer network to monitor each and every pub-
lication it carries would "impose an undue burden on the free flow of infor-
mation."269 Based on what the court termed "the relevant First 
Amendment considerations," the standard of liability was held to be 
whether CompuServe "knew or had reason to know of the allegedly defam-
atory Rumorville statements. "270 Because there was no evidence of such 
knowledge, the claims against CompuServe were dismissed. 
This decision was greeted with acclaim, as a great victory for the First 
Amendment.271 Certainly, it would have meant the death knell for free 
speech on computer bulletin boards if the network had been treated as a 
"speaker." AI!, the Supreme Court has observed about bookstores and mag-
azine stands, "If the contents ... were restricted to material of which their 
proprietors had made an inspection, they might be depleted indeed."272 
Unfortunately, the rule in Cubby does not go far enough to protect 
free speech on computer networks. The linchpin of the protection against 
liability is the network's ignorance of both the defamatory message and 
circumstances which would alert a reasonable observer to the message. 
That is a largely illusory bulwark. All that any person or corporation would 
need to do to stop criticism from appearing on a network is notify the 
owner of the network that there is defamatory language appearing by a 
particular speaker.273 The network would then be on notice of the offend-
ing publication and, arguably, of the possibility that similarly defamatory 
statements would be forthcoming by the offending speaker. 
In the vast majority of instances, the network owner will have no 
knowledge of the accuracy of the charges being made, and will be forced to 
either censor the speech or face the burden of undertaking an arduous, 
and likely inconclusive, investigation. Even in those rare times when the 
network owner has personal knowledge of the underlying facts, the costs 
and risks of litigation will deter all but the most stalwart network owner 
from carrying the contentious message. 
The First Amendment prohibits the enforcement of liability rules 
which lead to such a result. In Philadelphia Newspapers v. HeppS,274 the 
Supreme Court held that placing the burden of proving truthfulness on 
those "who publish speech of public concern deters such speech because of 
the fear that liability will uIYustifiably result .... [S]uch a 'chilling' effect 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 140-4!. 
271 See, e.g., Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum? Computer Bulletin Boards, Free 
Speech, and State Action, 81 GEO. LJ. 409, 439 (1992). 
272 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959). 
273 Such a tactic has apparently been used with some success against television broadcasters. 
After learning of plans to broadcast a political advertisement on Washington, D.C.'s local televi-
sion stations attacking Pizza Hut's position on health care, Pizza Hut's lawyer sent the following 
message to each station: "If you cause to be broadcast any statement to the effect that Pizza Hut 
does not offer health care for its employees in the United States, the company will regard that 
false broadcast as having been made with knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard of falsity." 
Howard Kurtz, Local Stations Bar Ad Attacking Pizza Hut, WASH. POST, July 21, 1994, at C1, C5. 
Although all the stations denied the letter had any impact on their decision, none of the stations 
would broadcast the advertisemenL Id. 
274 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
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would be antithetical to the First Amendment's protection of true speech 
on matters of public concern .... "275 
The FCC, in a little noticed rulemaking, struck a reasonable balance 
that can seIVe as a model for the entire future of telecommunications. The 
issue before the Commission was whether a Multipoint Distribution SeIVice 
("MDS") common carrier was either required or permitted to censor pro-
gramming it "reasonably determine[d]" was obscene.276 The Commission 
stated that, while common carriers do not enjoy absolute immunity from 
liability, they should only be held responsible for the programming of 
others if there is "a high degree of involvement or actual notice of an ille-
gal use."277 Cognizant that a complaint against a carrier could be viewed as 
putting the carrier on notice of the salacious nature of a given program 
scheduled for rebroadcast, the Commission wisely declared that it was "re-
luctant to place MDS common carriers in the uncertain predicament of 
watching all programming and assessing, in each instance, whether to en-
gage the legal machinery for interpretive rulings."278 Accordingly, the 
Commission ruled that it would only hold MDS common carriers crimi-
nally responsible if a court had made the determination of obscenity first. 
Under this definition, "actual notice of an illegal use" means "actual notice 
that a program has been adjudicated obscene. "279 
Thus, the obscenity rules are not to be interpreted so as to encourage 
MDS common carriers to censor the programming of others. The FCC 
tried to limit further the problem of unqualified private censorship in its 
discussion of carrier discretion to refuse carriage of potentially obscene 
programmers. The FCC announced that it would allow "an MDS common 
carrier who has reason to believe that its facilities are being used for an 
illegal purpose to petition the appropriate state, local or federal authority 
(e.g., United States Attorney) for a ruling that its customers' programming 
violates [federal obscenity] or other applicable law."28o The MDS opera-
tors are free to make this determination unilaterally, but, as the FCC 
warned, they "may later be subject to legal action [for wrongful termina-
tion] if the transmissions in question are found to be lawful. "281 
This is an appropriate scheme for the emerging communications tech-
nology as well. Speakers and programmers are responsible for their 
speech. Carriers who seIVe as common carriers are neither under a duty 
nor encouraged to undertake the difficult private determination of 
whether speech is or is not protected. Once an independent tribunal has 
275 [d. at 777. 
276 Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of 
Obscene Materials, 2 F.C.C.R 2819 (1987). MDS stations use omnidirectional microwave signals 
to deliver customer-supplied information from a stationary transmitter to subscribers. The most 
common subscribers are typically either hotels, apartment complexes or single family residences. 
See generally, BRENNER ET AL., supra note 88, § 16.04[1]. 
277 Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene 
Materials, 2 F.C.C.R at 2820. 
278 [d. 
279 [d. 
280 [d. at 2819. 
281 [d. (footnote omitted). 
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evaluated the program, the risk to the First Amendment is minimal, as the 
only speech being silenced by the carrier will be unprotected speech. 
The standard for liability of distributors should be the same as that 
utilized by the FCC: "a high degree of involvement or actual notice of an 
illegal use."282 Carriers who by law or contract serve only as "conduits" for 
the speech of others would only be responsible for distributing the speech 
of another if they have "actual notice" that the speech has previously been 
adjudicated illegal or unprotected. Thus, cable operators providing must-
carry or public and leased access programming, telephone companies pro-
viding dial-it services on a lottery or other common carrier basis, and com-
puter networks available to all would each be under this umbrella of 
protection. 
Of course, with this protection comes a limitation on the freedom to 
silence others. Such carriers should only be permitted to keep out illegal 
and unprotected speech. The determination of illegality should be made 
by an independent court or agency, and a carrier making that decision 
without such guidance should be held responsible to the silenced speaker 
if the speech is found not to be illegal. 
There is one last category of distributor requiring special attention, 
consisting of distributors who are not common carriers but, nonetheless, 
serve as an important forum for the speech of others. Many computer net-
works, for example, retain the ultimate ability to bar users who go beyond 
some limit, but otherwise provide open access to bulletin boards and 
message services. The network's ability to refuse carriage precludes treat-
ment as common carriers,283 but they are not properly viewed as primary 
speakers either. 
One such network, Prodigy, a joint venture of Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
and I.B.M., offers numerous services, including over 100 electronic bill-
boards, to more than one million subscribers.284 Prodigy has vigorously 
defended its right to refuse to carry programming it finds offensive. It ad-
vertises itself as a "family-oriented" service, and uses both a five-person crew 
and computer software to catch expletives and otherwise offensive words 
and phrases.285 
Prodigy defends its right to censor offensive material by arguing it was 
only "using its editorial discretion, [and] chose not to publish [offensive] 
submissions and other similar material .... The First Amendment protects 
private publishers, like the New York Times and Prodigy, from Government 
interference in what we publish."286 
282 Id. at 2820. 
283 See, e.g., National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630,641 (D.C. Cir.), 
em. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). 
284 For a good discussion of the controversies involving Prodigy's policies, see Naughton, 
supra note 271. 
285 See, e.g., Barnaby]. Feder, Toward Defining Free Speech in the Computer A~, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
1991, atE5; Sandra Sugawara, Computer Networks and the 1st Amendment, WASH. POST, Oct. 26,1991, 
at A12. See generally Philip H. Miller, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First Amendment 
Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L.REY. 1147 (1993) (discussing Prodigy and 
other services). 
286 Geoffrey Moore, The First Amendment is Safe at Prodigy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1990, § 3, at 13. 
Prodigy was involved in a controversy in mid-1991 when one of its billboards began displaying 
vicious anti-Semitic messages. The Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith (ADL) com-
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The print analogy may be useful rhetorically, but is actually quite dan-
gerous. A securities investment banking finn was accused of criminal fraud 
on Prodigy's "Money Talk" bulletin board. When the company sued Prod-
igy for libel, a court found that "Prodigy exercised sufficient editorial con-
trol of its computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the same 
responsibilities as a newspaper. "287Even the newsstand analogy of CUbby288 
would not have protected Prodigy once it learned of the disputed message. 
If networks like Prodigy are held responsible for comments they do 
not produce, free discussion on bulletin boards will be at risk. To hold that 
a network becomes the speaker as soon as it makes any decision either on 
the general topic for a bulletin board, such as issues relating to financial 
matters, or on the tone of the language pennitted, such as barring inde-
cent language, will either force networks to censor everyone's speech or 
lead to the end of both limited topic and family-appropriate bulletin 
boards. This will needlessly diminish free speech in an evolving media. A 
far better approach would be to only find liability when the non-common 
carrier network has had a high "degree of ... involvement"289 in the illegal 
speech. 
Under this proposal, a network owner who dedicates a bulletin board 
to explicit sexual material will be criminally liable if the material is found to 
be obscene.29o Other network owners will be responsible if they actively 
participate in the discussions or messages which are the subject of the liti-
gation, or in other circumstances where it can be fairly concluded that the 
plained to Prodigy and asked them to censor the offending items. At first, Prodigy refused, citing 
its policy of permitting free exchange on its bulletin boards. Some argued that because Prodigy 
both retained the ability to delete messages which it felt were offensive and permitted the anti-
Semitic tirades to continue, "Prodigy did not regard them as offensive." Melvin Salberg & Abra-
ham H. Foxman, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at A30. Finally, Prodigy re-
lented, and announced that "offensiveness" included statements "grossly repugnant to 
community standards." See Sandra Sugawara, Computer Network to Ban 'Repugnant' Comments, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1991, at AI. 
287 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1995). 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 260-70. 
289 Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of 
Obscene Materials, 2 F.C.C.R. 2819, 2820 (1987). As with common carriers, such networks will 
also be liable if they have "actual knowledge" of a message's prior adjudicated illegality. See supra 
text accompanying notes 278-80. There may be some support, as well, for imposing liability for 
distributing obscene materials on a non-common carrier network that is aware of the "character 
and content of the material." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974). The Supreme 
Court has been much more willing to uphold laws that chill speech near the border between 
obscenity and protected speech, than those which operate on the border between defamation 
and legitimate criticism. Compare Hamling, 418 U.S. at 124 (upholding an obscenity law because 
"[t]he precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing 
that he does so") (quoting United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930» with N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1969) (striking down a defamation law because speakers "tend 
to make only statements which, 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.' The rule thus dampens the 
vigor and limits the variety of public debate.") (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 
(1958». 
290 See, e.g., 2 Convicted in Computer Pornography Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at B7. 
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network owner has adopted the speech of the network user.291 A more 
passive network would generally avoid liability.292 
There is obviously, and deliberately, some flexibility in the determina-
tion of how "active" the network's participation must be. The multiplicity 
of networks and the variety of their policies preclude any "one size fits all" 
rule. If a distributor has a no-censorship policy, it will face no liability. The 
more involved a network owner is in the speech of others, the more appro-
priate it is to treat the speech as the responsibility of the owner. Thus, 
network owners who wish to exercise control will be free to do so, aware 
that they will be held responsible to the extent of their involvement. The 
law, however, will encourage greater freedom for the multiple users of the 
network. Each network owner will be provided with protection from liabil-
ity that increases as the network functions more as a conduit, permitting 
others to speak freely.293 
The rules of liability for distributors must be different from those for 
speakers. Speakers must be held responsible for their own speech. We 
must be ever vigilant, however, that in the regulation of the new media 
technology, threats of litigation and liability against carriers, common and 
uncommon, do not "shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of 
information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to 
[publishing facilities]-who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even 
though they are not members of the press. "294 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 1965, the Supreme Court characterized the United States postal sys-
tem as "the main artery through which the business, social and personal 
affairs of the people are conducted and upon which depends in a greater 
degree than upon any other activity of government the promotion of the 
general welfare."295 In the not-too-distant future, the convergence of cable 
television, telephones and computers will produce an electronic artery, 
transporting more communication from more diverse sources than was 
ever before possible. 
291 See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Student Accused of Running Netwurkfor Pirated Software, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 9, 1994, § 1, at 1 (operator of bulletin board which distributed pirated software charged with 
using code names to warn users to keep the network secret). 
292 See, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (1991) (describing Com-
puServe as possessing the contractual right to refuse to carry particular offerings but generally 
exerting "little or no editorial control"). See generally Jonathan Gilbert, Note, Computer Bulletin 
Board operator Liabilityfor User Misuse, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 439, 441 (1985) (discussing the "impo-
sition ofliability on the operator who does not encourage or approve of the misuse" ofits bulletin 
board). 
293 See also Perritt, supra note 192, at 131 (proposing that ton immunities "should be less 
available to network service providers that engage in content-based discrimination"). One com-
mentator proposed the additional requirement that bulletin board operators desiring immunity 
help deter libelous statements by requiring identification codes for users and warning all system 
users of the liability for defamatory messages. Robert Charles, Note, Computer Bulletin Boards and 
Defamation: Who Should be Liable? Under ~ Standard?, 2J.L. & TECH 121, 147 (1987). 
294 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
295 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305-06 n.3 (1965) (quoting Pike v. Walker, 
121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941». 
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Regulators and courts must realize that the Constitution neither man-
dates nor permits speakers and distributors to be treated the same in all 
circumstances. If the new distributors face neither direct governmental di-
rective nor subtler encouragement to engage in private censorship, and the 
government encourages access to, while staying neutral in, the digital mar-
ketplace of electronic;: ideas, the new technologies can create the most dem-
ocratic mass communication system in world history. 
